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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, civil rights advocates have lamented
the conservative trends in the Supreme Court, and the White House
and Congress's disregard of civil rights.1 In advocates' eyes, civil
rights have slowly eroded in the courts, and racial inequity has
steadily mounted in reality.2 No small effort, singular legislation, or
1. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged
Blacks-From Clarence Thomas to the 'The Law School Five," 46 HOW. L.J. 175, 178
n.17 (2003) (lamenting the current Court's efforts to overturn the progress of the
Warren Court); Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1029 (2002) (noting that the Court is actually
more conservative than Congress); CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS & CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007), http://www
.cccr.org/downloads/civil.rightsl.pdf. In addition, presidents have appointed
conservative members to the federal judiciary, the Senate has confirmed them, and
Congress has passed no legislation contrary to their conservative opinions. See
generally Theresa M. Beiner, How the Contentious Nature of Federal Judicial
Appointments Affects "Diversity" on the Bench, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 849 (2005).
2. See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm"? Racial
Resegregation, High Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North
Carolina, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1375 (2003); ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE & GARY
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even a progressive president will dramatically reverse this reality.
The regular harassment of African American drivers will not end
simply with the enactment of racial profiling legislation. Equal
educational opportunities will not occur simply because plaintiffs
obtain a cause of action to challenge racial inequities.
Environmentally polluted minority neighborhoods will not become
clean because the Environmental Protection Agency has the
authority to intervene, nor will neighborhoods become desegregated
because Congress makes more housing vouchers available to low-
income families.
In recent years, advocates have struggled to retain old victories
and slow, rather than stop, the exacerbation of these inequities.
However, the time may be coming when advocates can again "make
dents" in these problems. For the first time since 1991, the possibility
of new significant civil rights legislation is real. Democrats gained
control of Congress last year,3 and they may be joined by a
Democratic president in 2009.4 Each of the top Democratic
presidential candidates has recognized, at least rhetorically, the need
for substantive change in the racial status quo, and indicated that he
or she will be more protective of civil rights than recent
administrations.5 For instance, responding to a question about racial
problems at a Howard University debate, Barack Obama, Hillary
Clinton, and John Edwards directly acknowledged that issues of race
are serious, and demand their attention and work.6 At varying times,
they each have promised to take action to address the issues.7
ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? (2003), http://www
.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (analyzing the
increase in school segregation as a result of Supreme Court decisions).
3. John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006, at Al.
4. Carl P. Leubsdorf, President Hillary? Gore May Be Democrats' More Bankable
Candidate-If He'll Run, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 25, 2006, at 21A (noting that
polls of the electorate favor Democratic presidential candidates by a substantial
margin); Frank Newport et al., Where the Election Stands: June 2007, A Gallup Poll
Review, GALLOP POLL NEWS SERV., June 27, 2007, http://www.gallup.comI
poll27985/Where-Election-Stands-June-2007.aspx (finding that most indicators favor
democratic candidates).
5. See Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2008 Presidential Candidate, Remarks at
the 2007 Democratic Primary Debate at Howard University (June 28, 2007),
http://ontheissues.org/2008Hillary-ClintonCivilRights.htm; Senator John Edwards,
2008 Presidential Candidate, Remarks at the 2007 Democratic Primary Debate at
Howard University (June 28, 2007), http://ontheissues.org/2008/John-EdwardsCivil
_Rights.htm; Senator Barack Obama, 2008 Presidential Candidate, Remarks at the
2007 Democratic Primary Debate at Howard University (June 28, 2007),
http://ontheissues.org/2008/Barack-ObamaCivilRights.htm.
6. Hillary Clinton's response to the question was "that race and racism are
defining challenges... [b]ut there is so much left to be done. And for anyone to assert
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Many believe the time for action is well overdue. The last time
Congress passed any significant civil rights legislation was in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.8 The 1991 Act was designed to overturn the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of actionable employment
discrimination claims, including its rejection of a disparate impact
theory.9 Moreover, the 1991 Act was not an unusual effort at the
time. A few years prior to the 1991 Act, Congress, in response to
Supreme Court decisions, passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 to expand private causes of action for gender, race, age, and
that race is not a problem in America is to deny the reality in front of our very eyes."
Clinton, supra note 5. John Edwards was even more aggressive in his response,
stating that "discrimination has had an impact that still is alive [and] well in America,
and it goes through every single part of American life." Edwards, supra note 5.
Responding to the question last, Obama voiced his approval of the other candidates'
appraisals, echoing that, although significant progress has been made in regard to
race, more work is to be done because "we live in a society that remains separated in
terms of life opportunities for African-Americans, for Latinos, and the rest of the
nation." Obama, supra note 5.
7. Clinton proclaimed that "when it comes to racial justice right now[,] I'm willing
to work hard to be a strong advocate for Civil Rights and human rights here at home
and around the world." Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2008 Presidential Candidate,
Remarks at Senate Debate in Manhattan (Oct. 8, 2000), http://ontheissues
.org/2008/HillaryClinton.CivilRights.htm. John Edwards premised the theme of his
campaign on the existence of a divided America, or what he calls "two Americas," one
for the haves and one for the have-nots, which he vowed to attack. Senator John
Edwards, 2004 Vice-Presidential Candidate, Remarks at the Democratic Primary
Debate in Albuquerque, N.M. (Sept. 4, 2003), http://ontheissues.org/2008/John
_Edwards_Education.htm (speaking of the two educational systems in America). For
him, this issue "is not an African-American issue, not a Latino issue, not an Asian-
American issue. This is an American issue," which we all have a responsibility to
solve. Senator John Edwards, 2004 Vice-Presidential Candidate, Acceptance Speech to
the Democratic National Convention (July 28, 2004), http://ontheissues.org/2004/John
_EdwardsCiviLRights.htm. Moreover, he explicitly sees law as helping solve these
problems and proposes using it "to break down some of these economic and racial
barriers." Senator John Edwards, 2008 Presidential Candidate, Remarks at the Take
Back America 2007 Conference (June 19, 2007), http://ontheissues.org/2008/John
_Edwards_Welfare_+_Poverty.htm. (advocating the use of federal programs to help
desegregate neighborhoods and create opportunities for the inner city poor to move
elsewhere). Barack Obama likewise argues that addressing the problems of race and
inequality is not only good for minorities, but "good for America as a whole." Obama,
supra note 5. His assertion that "there's got to be political will in the White House to
make [racial equity] happen" indicates that he, as well, would be committed to such
ends. Id.
8. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
9. Congress explicitly indicated that its purpose for the Act was "to respond to
recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Id. at
1071. See generally Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination
Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000)
(discussing the 1991 amendments and other changes in employment discrimination).
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disability discrimination in federally funded programs.lo Similarly,
Congress had amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to overturn the
Court's rejection of voting rights claims based on disparate impact or
discriminatory effects in City of Mobile v. Bolden."
In the years following the 1991 Act, the Supreme Court issued a
series of decisions that again narrowed the scope of civil rights
claims. Congress has yet to respond. The Court's decisions have, for
instance, limited the ability of plaintiffs to seek attorney's fees from
defendants,12 placing the viability of many civil rights cases in
jeopardy.13 In employment cases, the Court has permitted employers
to force employees to contract away their civil rights protections.14
Victims of reoccurring toxic and environmental hazards in minority
neighborhoods, individuals who are denied drivers' licenses because
they do not speak or read English fluently, and children who suffer
from gross racial disparities in school discipline, funding, and quality
all have seen their right to challenge these circumstances in federal
court largely eliminated.15 The Court's decisions have also had
10. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
In Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Court had held that a plaintiff
only had a cause of action if the specific program in which he faced discrimination had
received federal funds. See id. at 573-74. Thus, if the school only received federal funds
for its special education program, and no other program, the school would have been
free to discriminate against students in other programs. Id. The Civil Rights Act of
1987 overturned this holding. See, e.g., Leake v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 695 F.
Supp. 1414, 1415-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
11. 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980). See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 2,
84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)); see also Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (discussing and applying the amendment).
12. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001).
13. Limitations on claims for attorney's fees goes to the heart of all civil rights
cases, as they allow plaintiffs to pursue cases that plaintiffs otherwise could not afford.
See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986); 0. Whitman Smith,
Erosion of Civil Rights Enforcement: Judicial Constriction of the Civil Rights and
Disability Law Bar, 28 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 41 (2002). Moreover, the threat of paying
those fees provides plaintiffs with what may be their only leverage during negotiation.
See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731-35 (1986).
14. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119-22 (2001).
15. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (eliminating an individual's
right under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to challenge disparate impact in
federally funded programs); see also Sam Spital, Restoring Brown's Promise of
Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can't Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETrER
L.J. 93, 111 (2003) (discussing post-Sandoval litigation and the barrier for plaintiffs
seeking to use federal law to redress racial discrimination); Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1436, 1520-21 (2005) (noting the "setbacks" Sandoval created); Melane K. Gross,
Note, Invisible Shackles: Alexander v. Sandoval and the Compromise to the Medical
Civil Rights Movement, 47 HOW. L.J. 943, 981-86 (2004) (discussing how Sandoval
undermines medical civil rights strategies); Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of
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negative effects on the rights of women, individuals with disabilities,
older workers, and citizens in general.16
In 2004, a coalition endorsed legislation to reverse these
decisions and to again give citizens the power to address these and
other inequities in court.17 The legislation, titled the Fairness and
Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil
Rights Act of 2004 (Fairness Act), addresses negative decisions in
areas including race, gender, age, disability, employment, and
various other civil rights categories.'8 Over one hundred United
States Representatives and twenty-five Senators sponsored the
Fairness Act, as well as over sixty national nonprofit and advocacy
organizations.19 On January 24, 2008, Senator Edward Kennedy
Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 819, 871-72 (2006) (finding that Sandoval
took "the air out of the environmental justice movement's litigation sails").
16. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (declining to
hold that each paycheck received in a gender discrimination case under Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act, subsequent to an alleged discriminatory pay decision, was a
discrete discriminatory act triggering the time limit for filing a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and affirming summary judgment in favor of
the defendant); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (finding that expansions
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that reached claims of disparate impact apply more
narrowly to claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or age
discrimination claims generally, than to other Title VII claims); Kolstad v. Am. Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that an award of punitive damages under Title VII
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could not be upheld under the theory of vicarious
liability and that the plaintiff must show malice or reckless indifference on the part of
the employer); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (holding that the
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1994 allowing punitive and compensatory damages
under Title VII did not apply to cases pending at the time of the Act's passage); Rivers
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) (declining to retroactively apply
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which extended the coverage of claims under
§ 1981 to discriminatory contract terminations).
17. Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil
Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004), http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d108:HR03809:@@@D&summ2=m&. In general, the bill would "restore,
reaffirm, and reconcile legal rights and remedies under [the varying] civil rights
statutes." 150 CONG. REC. H514 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2004). Specifically, it would amend
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Education Amendments of 1972, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 to permit plaintiffs to establish discrimination based on
disparate impact. Id. In addition, the bill would amend the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide that a
state's receipt or use of federal financial assistance for a state program or activity shall
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity to a suit under such Acts by a program
employee. Id. Finally, it would authorize civil actions in federal court for
discrimination based on disability by amending the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986. Id.
18. Id.
19. See CIVILRIGHTS.ORG, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIL RIGHTS,
ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSING FAIRNESS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 2004,
http://www.civilrights.org/campaigns/civil-rights-actlorg-support.html (listing the
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reintroduced this legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 2008.20
Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton joined in co-sponsoring
this legislation.21
The most important aspect of the Civil Rights Act of 2008, or any
other new civil rights legislation, will be the question of whether to
amend or change the Supreme Court's intentional discrimination
standard. The Court applies the intentional discrimination standard
to almost all antidiscrimination statutes, but it has proven most
problematic in race and gender discrimination cases. In contrast to
other intent, mens rea, and liability standards, the intentional
discrimination standard places a high burden of proof on plaintiffs,
which can rarely be met without admissions or smoking-gun
evidence. For this and several other reasons, the intentional
discrimination standard has been the subject of intense critique for
several years. 22
The purpose of this Article, however, is not to take sides in a
legislative debate or the interpretation of past statutes, nor to
propose specific legislative changes. Rather, the purpose of this
Article is to frame the legislative approach to assessing the
appropriate intent or liability standard in civil rights legislation and
to emphasize the factors that should and should not be relevant in
deliberations. In particular, the goal is to prevent the discussion from
devolving into the subjective polemics that normally accompany
issues of liability in race discrimination cases. Notions of what
conduct is immoral, prejudiced, biased, or faulty too often dominate
the question of what activities should be prohibited in order to help
promote racial equity.23 Consequently, the actual pursuit of progress
in racial equity becomes only an afterthought. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's requirement of "invidious discriminatory
supporting organizations); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004); Civil Rights Act of 2004, S.
2088, 108th Cong. (2004).
20. Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. (2008).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1437-39, 1512
(2d ed. 1988); Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See"" White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 963-66 (1993);
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978);
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 291-94 (1997).
23. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 925-30 (1993) (concluding that proof of fault was at the core of the Rehnquist
Court's view of discrimination); id. at 970-71 (critiquing the notion that moral
wrongfulness is relevant to discrimination); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact
Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 773-75 (2006) (arguing for the relevance of
blame in discrimination cases).
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purpose"--or acting "because of," not simply "in spite of,"24 the harms
that befall minorities-has perpetuated the notion that
antidiscrimination law only prohibits activity that is immoral or
reprehensible, rather than simply contrary to the goals of
antidiscrimination law. The Court has rejected a disparate impact
standard because the Court does not deem the activity that the
disparate impact standard prohibits to be discriminatory and, thus,
immoral or reprehensible.25 These holdings have fostered an
extensive and charged debate over the intent and impact standards.26
The debate persists, in part, because both sides assume that an
identifiable, normative notion of fault exists in discrimination and
should be implemented through a standard. Both sides have differing
views of what it means to discriminate, and believe that their views
have moral or normative authority. The premise of this Article is
that antidiscrimination law should reflect policy objectives, not
moralistic or normative notions of fault. If antidiscrimination law is
policy driven, the debate becomes less about pointing fingers at
particular activities and people as being discriminatory, and more a
discussion about how to create a society that functions for the benefit
of everyone. Likewise, in federally funded programs, the goal
becomes one of promoting racial equity rather than conceding to the
perpetuation of inequity. This Article is directed at those individuals
and legislators who have not chosen sides in the charged debate over
disparate impact and discriminatory intent, and provides a broad,
neutral framework with which to approach new civil rights
legislation.
The best way to do this is to turn our discussion to the less
emotional and politically charged lessons found in tort law, and leave
the specific issues of discrimination behind. Such a turn is
appropriate, as antidiscrimination law is but a species of tort.27 In
tort, one finds that no sacrosanct or inherent form of fault justifies
imposing or alleviating liability. The mens rea, intent, or substituted
standards vary widely across torts.28  Neither context nor
circumstances can explain this variance. Instead, the variance itself
demonstrates the nonexistence of an inherent concept of fault in tort.
24. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74 (1979) (requiring
a "discriminatory purpose" and requiring the defendant to act because of gender); Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)
(requiring "invidious discriminatory purpose [as] motivating factor").
25. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 565.
26. For a discussion of that debate and the longstanding battle for a disparate
impact standard, see Selmi, supra note 23, at 702-08 (2006).
27. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
28. See infra notes 89-117.
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Particular liability standards or mental states are chosen for certain
torts and in certain contexts, not because they reflect fault, but
because they produce desired results.29
Tort law does not delude itself, as does antidiscrimination law,
with the notion that it is punishing "wrongdoers" or morally
unacceptable "faulty" conduct. Tort law is largely policy driven,
determining the ends that the law should produce and then shaping
standards of legal liability to achieve them.30 Thus, nothing is
particularly significant or indicates inherent culpability in a
standard based, for instance, on foreseeability, substantial certainty,
or deliberate indifference, other than the fact that such standards
regulate society in a manner that will produce desirable outcomes.
This is not to suggest that people who accidentally kill and those who
intentionally kill are morally indistinguishable from one another; a
difference certainly exists and criminal law takes that difference into
account. However, a tort system need not if, for instance, its only
purpose is to compensate family members for their loss of support. In
that case, the defendant's motives are irrelevant.31 Likewise, if the
goal of antidiscrimination law is to reduce racial inequity,
segregation, or barriers, a defendant's motives are irrelevant.
As this analogy suggests, understanding how and why tort
liability standards are sculpted is instructive in analyzing
antidiscrimination standards. A comparison between the two is
invaluable for legislators who seek to adopt any new meaningful,
effective, and appropriately conceptualized civil rights legislation.
The initial inclination of many, however, would be to consult and rely
heavily on Supreme Court antidiscrimination precedent.
Unfortunately, they are unlikely to find adequate explanation or
structure there. Supreme Court precedent lacks any transparency as
to why the Court adopted the intentional discrimination standard
and later expanded its applicability.32 The Court simply proceeded as
though the intent standard is inherently appropriate and necessarily
identifies all of the actions that are contrary to equal protection and
antidiscrimination. Moreover, outside of some general favoritism
29. See infra notes 148-76 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 145-53.
31. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (2000) ("[lf compensation is an
unqualified goal in itself, defendants would be liable whenever they caused harm, even
if they were not at fault.').
32. For a more lengthy discussion of this lack of explanation, see Derek W. Black,
The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How
Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 569-72 (2006).
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toward "colorblindness,"33 the Court has spoken nothing of goals or
the treatment that equal protection and antidiscrimination
guarantee. Yet, tort principles demonstrate that, without attention to
the goals or intended results of equal protection and
antidiscrimination, nothing justifies the intent standard or renders it
more appropriate than other standards.
Though the Court has failed to articulate goals, this does not
mean that they do not exist. Insofar as the intentional discrimination
standard appears designed to produce a consistent set of results, the
Court's goals are implicit. A tort approach emphasizes that,
regardless of what the Court's goals are, Congress's goals must
control, at least, in regard to its statutes. Thus, a tort approach
prompts us to assess whether the Court's implicit goals are
consistent with the goals the democratic process has deemed
appropriate. Moreover, a tort-based approach demands an
identification of the actual results of the intent standard, or any
other standard, and whether those results further our goals. Insofar
as antidiscrimination law's aim, like torts, is to produce efficient and
socially productive results, the intent standard falls short.
Part I of this Article begins by explaining why tort law concepts
are relevant to constitutional and antidiscrimination law. Part II
explores the concept of fault in historical and current torts,
demonstrating that fault is not a normative concept and has no
inherent meaning other than that one has transgressed some
standard that a legislature or court has adopted. Part III reveals that
tort standards are adopted to further societal goals, not to identify or
punish wrongful conduct. Part IV applies these concepts to
antidiscrimination law and, in particular, the intentional
discrimination standard, to demonstrate that the intent standard is
designed to pursue values and interests adopted by the Court, rather
than those explicit or implicit in civil rights legislation. Part V
stresses that we can only determine the appropriate standard by
having a serious democratic conversation focusing on the values and
interests we wish to achieve through antidiscrimination law. The
Article concludes with an evaluation of the potential standards that
can be applied to achieve congressional ends.
I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TORT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Some might query why tort law serves as an appropriate
comparison for or critique of antidiscrimination law, and the
intentional discrimination standard in particular. First, the Supreme
33. For an explanation of the Court's colorblind jurisprudence, see Tanya Kateri
Hern~ndez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind
Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 139-56 (1998).
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Court has not provided a rationale for the intent standard. Thus, we
have no framework from which to construct new standards. Tort
law's clear framework provides a means by which to bridge this gap.
Second, although the Court has recently strayed from tort law in its
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, tort and constitutional violations
are inherently intertwined. Deprivations of equal protection, due
process, property, and other rights secured by the Constitution are
"constitutional torts." As the Supreme Court indicated in Imbler v.
Pachtman,34 deprivations of constitutional and federal law under 42
U.S.C § 1983 are but a "species of tort liability."35 Similarly, Dan
Dobbs flatly states, "civil rights violations are torts."36 Moreover, civil
rights causes of action regularly overlap with trespassory torts.37
For example, some common law tort assaults and batteries also
constitute deprivations of life and liberty under the Due Process
Clause.3s In the same way, an intentional infliction of emotional
distress might accompany the denial of equal protection. Some
nontrespassory torts also have civil rights analogs. Police misconduct
was traditionally litigated under the common law action for
malicious prosecution, but is now more commonly litigated under the
Fourth Amendment law of search and seizure.39 Finally, state courts
must align common law torts such as defamation with the First
Amendment to ensure free speech rights are not infringed through
tort claims.40
The overlap alone, however, does not fully elucidate the
connection between common law torts and constitutional torts.
Common law torts serve as a theoretical foundation for developing
liability standards in constitutional torts. As the Court wrote in
Carey v. Piphus:
[O]ver the centuries the common law of torts has developed a
set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be
compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his
legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and
the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate
starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well.41
34. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
35. Id. at 417; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994); Memphis
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).
36. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 81.
37. Id. at 81-94.
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. See generally Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
40. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978).
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The Court has consistently reiterated this sentiment, writing that
constitutional rights are "governed by federal rules conforming in
general to common-law tort principles."42
The Court has also spoken directly to the connection between
intent standards in torts and civil rights. In Monroe v. Pape,43 the
Court reasoned that proof of intent and liability in constitutional
torts "should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions."44 Due process and Eighth Amendment claims have, as a
result, implemented standards that closely resemble or refine
common law theories of negligence, intent, and recklessness.45 As a
historical matter, the same has been true of equal protection and
antidiscrimination standards.
Lower courts continued to apply the intent doctrine in a manner
that was consistent with objective common law intent, rather than
subjective motive-based intent, even after the Supreme Court in
Washington v. Davis46 and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.47 held that equal protection
claims of race discrimination would be governed by a new motive-
based intent doctrine. Lower courts inferred intent "based on actions
taken, coupled with omissions made, by governmental authorities
which have the natural and foreseeable consequence of causing
[racial inequality]."48 Objective common law principles were so
ingrained in lower courts' assessment of liability in equal protection
cases that it was not until the Supreme Court reversed additional
lower court decisions that the lower courts fully abandoned their
objective criteria and adopted the Court's subjective criteria for
42. Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 483 (1994)); see also Carey, 435 U.S. at 257-58.
43. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
44. Id. at 187.
45. See, e.g., Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the definition of gross negligence as required to sustain a due process claim
in terms of intent, reasonableness, and forseeability); see also Jay Conison, What Does
Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1165-66 (1994)
(discussing the judicial use of common law principles to guide interpretation of due
process); Holly Boyer, Note, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment's
'Cruel and Unusual Punishment' Clause as Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 Sw. U. L.
REV. 317, 320 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's use of common law standards to
rule on an Eighth Amendment claim).
46. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
47. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
48. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
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proving intent.49 The Court, unfortunately, failed to explain why it
made this drastic change. The intentional discrimination doctrine
became the controlling standard simply because the Supreme Court
"said so." Thus, a gap in understanding the Court's
antidiscrimination jurisprudence was created.
Tort law can help fill this gap. Tort law is the foundation for
much of antidiscrimination law. By looking to this basic foundation,
we can perhaps gain some insight into the Court's implicit rationale
and create a more balanced analysis of the intent doctrine and its
alternatives.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND ADOPTION OF LIABILITY STANDARDS IN
TORT LAW
Although the term "fault" is used extensively in tort law, it lacks
any clear definition because it is not supported by a normative
principle of liability. To the extent that tort labels a defendant as
being at "fault," it does not mean that the defendant is morally
culpable, has engaged in "wrongful" conduct, or has transgressed
natural law. "Fault" merely indicates that the defendant has crossed
some line that the law has determined he should not. Moreover, that
line can be drawn for any number of reasons that have nothing to do
with the defendant "wronging" someone. As this section
demonstrates, the further one explores tort standards, the clearer it
becomes that liability standards are reflections of what society
deems, at any given time, to be necessary for social progress,
efficiency, retribution, compensation, or other pressing concerns. The
standards do not simply punish or identify "wrong" or normatively
faulty conduct.
A. The Rise and Relevance of Fault in Tort History
Tracing the historical origins of tort will not necessarily reveal a
normative theory of fault that justifies liability. From tort's
inception, courts have been reluctant to rely on any concept of fault
as an ultimate measure of liability. In fact, many argue that until the
formal rise of negligence during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, fault was entirely irrelevant.50 Initially, the
notion that an individual had a general legal duty to prevent harm
toward others was nonexistent.51 When the concept of negligence
49. See Black, supra note 32, at 539-40 (discussing the difficulty lower courts had
in evaluating evidence in discrimination cases after the Supreme Court's decision in
Sandoval).
50. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 266.
51. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 944 (1981).
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eventually developed, it was against a backdrop of no-liability, rather
than strict liability or liability without fault.52 Strict liability and no-
fault tort theories were avenues for reparation,53 but reparation itself
was not extensively available. Most individuals who were injured
simply had no claim in tort. Thus, strict liability and no-fault were
effectively deviations from the general rule of no-liability and, in any
event, were oblivious to a normative fault concept.
The notion that a defendant owed a duty to others and could be
at "fault" arose slowly.54 Initially, common carriers were the only
defendants upon whom courts imposed a general duty, and that duty
was primarily a response to public demands.55 Other than that duty,
the most one could expect from others was "fair play" or the
avoidance of acting in bad faith.56 Thus, most conduct that courts
would today label faulty was permissible. Even once courts
recognized a general duty of care in negligence, they were often
unwilling to impose liability based on the breach of this duty.
Instead, courts carved out circumstances where they reasoned no
duty existed and, hence, refused to impose liability despite the
existence of otherwise negligent conduct. Moreover, courts readily
accepted defenses, such as assumption of risk, as a means of
indirectly limiting defendants' duty and holding them blameless for
their conduct.57 When such defenses were unavailable, courts
sometimes manipulated the significance of particular facts and, in
the process, narrowed the scope of a defendant's duty.58 Likewise,
courts would recognize a duty, but simply limit the types of harm one
must guard against.59 The basis was not a lack of fault, but simply a
52. Id. at 959.
53. A debate between some exists as to whether strict liability and trespass are
appropriately recognized as no-fault schemes, but, in any event, this Article's reference
above the line to strict liability and no-fault still refer to the same class of cases
regardless of how some might characterize them. See generally Franz Werro, Tort Law
at the Beginning of the New Millennium: A Tribute to John G. Fleming's Legacy, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 155-56 (2001).
54. Rabin, supra note 51, at 945-46.
55. Id. at 944.
56. Id. The "fellow servant" rule operated in the same respect, exempting
employers from vicarious liability when an employee harmed a fellow employee rather
than a third party. See, e.g., Graczak v. City of St. Louis, 202 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Mo.
1947). Thus, although negligent conduct-for which the employer was otherwise
responsible-injured an employee, no remedy would exist. Id.
57. Rabin, supra note 51, at 943.
58. Rabin's prime example of this is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99
(1928), where the court's articulation of the facts was crafted to undermine the
recognition of a duty to warn. Rabin, supra note 51, at 957. By undermining the duty,
the court established "no duty" to warn. Id.
59. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, 818 F. Supp. 1366, 1368-69 (D. Nev. 1993)
(refusing to recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
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refusal to include certain damages as compensable harms.60 Finally,
courts disregarded a defendant's "fault," or rendered it irrelevant, by
arguing that contract or property law controlled rather than tort
law.61 Most notably, courts for decades used the contract concept of
privity to negate manufacturers' liability when their products injured
consumers.62
B. The Nonexistence of Fault as a Normative or Consistent
Concept in Current Tort Liability Standards
Fault is no more of a concrete or normative concept today, nor
any more determinative of liability, than it was historically.
Admittedly, today's torts are divided into formal categories with
specific mens rea, knowledge, or intent requirements, which some
might interpret as focusing on or identifying forms of fault that
justify liability. For instance, when the law finds that someone had
the legal intent to cause harm or that a person's negligence led to
harm, one might infer that this mens rea is indicative of normative
"fault" that justifies liability. But as the following demonstrates, the
mens rea or intent standards that tort uses to impose liability are
independent from traditional negligence); see also Therese Lee Carabillo, Comment,
Tort Law-Payton Revisited: The Beginning of the End of the Physical Harm
Requirement-Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129, 605 N.E.2d 805 (1993), 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 997, 999 (1993).
60. Rabin, supra note 51, at 949, 951-52 (finding that emotional distress cases
were not dismissed based on theory that due care had been exercised, and arguing that
commentators overlook these cases in examining fault). The courts' original rationale
was based on a fear of false claims (opening a floodgate of claims), the difficulty of
measuring damages, lack of precedent, and that the harm was indirect. See, e.g.,
Recent Developments, California Rejects Tort Action for Fear for Another, 15 STAN. L.
REV. 740, 741-43 (1963) (discussing a California decision in which a claim for
emotional distress was dismissed citing judicial administrative difficulties).
61. See, e.g., Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 1958) (finding that there is
no liability of independent contractor to person not in privity with him for injuries
resulting from defect in a product rebuilt or repaired by contractor); Palmer v. Miller,
43 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ill. 1942) ("[T]o impute the negligence of one person to another,
such persons must stand in a relation of privity .. "); Vistein v. Keeney, 593 N.E.2d
52, 61 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("As a general rule, if a plaintiff brings an action sounding
in tort and bases his claim upon a theory of duty owed by a defendant as a result of
contractual relations, he must be a party or privy to the contract in order to prevail.");
see also Rabin, supra note 51, at 945-46 (discussing tort law's slow emergence from
contract and property law).
62. See, e.g., Newton v. Brook, 32 So. 722, 723-24 (Ala. 1902) (finding no remedy in
tort law where the defendant failed to perform the terms of a contract); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Spinks, 30 S.E. 968, 970-71 (Ga. 1898) (finding no remedy in tort
law where a plaintiff was injured as a result of a breached contractual duty);
Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.). But see Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (finally disregarding the privity concept and imposing
liability)
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inconsistent. A simple review of the mens rea and liability standards
among the various torts shows that no core concept exists to justify
liability, and, hence, no normative concept of fault either.
In intentional torts, individuals are liable for volitional acts that
cause direct interference with other persons or their property. A
defendant need not intend to harm a plaintiff, but merely to touch,
move, or disturb the plaintiffs person or property.63 In fact, acting
with a mere substantial certainty that one's actions will contact
another's person or property is sufficient intent.64 Thus, the
defendant need only act volitionally, not with purpose to harm or
offend another.65 Moreover, the defendant's subjective intent is the
stated focus of inquiry, but this subjective intent is ascertained from
objective evidence.66 Consequently, regardless of his actual subjective
intent, a person who shoves another will be deemed to have intended
to commit battery.67
Negligence, by contrast, focuses solely upon one's outward
conduct, disregarding subjective intent.68 Conduct is negligent when
it creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others.69 However, one is
liable only for those harms that are foreseeable.70 With the narrow
exceptions of children71 and individuals suffering from a physical
incapacity72 or having superior knowledge,73 foreseeability is an
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(a)-(b) (1965) (stating that the mere
intent to cause the imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact when such
contact results will lead to liability for battery).
64. Id. § 8A cmt. b; Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Wash. 1955).
65. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 48.
66. Id. at 49.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 275.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
70. See DOBBS, supra note 31, at 334; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94-95 (1881) (writing that liability does not
attach to "an injury arising from inevitable accident, or ... from an act that ordinary
human care and foresight are unable to guard against") (quoting Chief Justice Nelson
of New York).
71. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 393 (Wash. 1979) (negligence of
children is based on the child's "age, intelligence, maturity, training and
experience .. "). Only when engaging in abnormally dangerous or inherently adult
activities are children held to a higher standard. Id.
72. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Gardner Wholesale, Inc., 256 So. 2d 877, 882 (Ala. 1972)
(stating that a person with a permanent visual impairment is required to act with the
ordinary care of a "person with a like infirmity," and not that of a person with no such
impairment).
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 12
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
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entirely objective standard based on the reasonably prudent person.74
Thus, a defendant may or may not have subjectively realized his
action created an unreasonable risk, but a finding of negligence will
still follow if a reasonably prudent person would have.75
The standards for defective products, engaging in abnormally
dangerous activities, and vicarious liability impose strict liability
with what is generally referred to as a lower level of "fault."76 For
instance, a defendant is liable for harms resulting from abnormally
dangerous activities even if he exercised the utmost care.77 The
rationale is that the defendant chooses to engage in an activity he
knows is extremely hazardous and from which the danger cannot be
eliminated.78 He also engages in this activity for his own economic
benefit.79 Thus, if the harm materializes, he is its cause, and he
knows he will be liable.
Similarly, with defective products, a manufacturer may not be
careless or intend to injure consumers; however, the manufacturer
puts products into the marketplace to make a profit, knowing that
that some products may be defective and injure consumers. When
these products harm consumers, liability should fall on the
manufacturer rather than the consumer, particularly when it is
either beyond the consumer's control to prevent the harm or it was a
harm that the manufacturer could have prevented.80 In short, the
manufacturer is at "fault" because it put a defective product on the
market.81
Vicarious liability is far less complex. Employers are liable
simply because their employees, working to further their employers'
interests, cause injury to others.82 However, similar to the other
categories of strict liability, employers knowingly place their
employees in positions where they can harm others, and the
employers reap an economic benefit from doing so. This justifies
imposing the burden of liability on employers.83
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
75. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 275.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
77. Id. § 519(1).
78. Id. § 520.
79. See id. § 520 cmt. d.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998).
81. Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
83. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968)
(justifying vicarious liability under the theory that the harms caused by the employee
where "characteristic" of the employer's business). For a full discussion of the
rationales for imposing vicarious liability, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and
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Some might argue that strict liability cannot be included within
the realm of claims based on "fault" because liability attaches in
strict liability regardless of intent, negligence, or some other
culpability concept.84 Such an argument, however, ignores the fact
that strict-liability defendants have engaged in action knowing that
harm is a possibility. The argument also assumes that negligent,
intentional, and other similar torts are based on fault. As
demonstrated in part above and in depth below, none of these torts
are based on a normative or inherent notion of fault. Moreover, even
were some concept of fault at work in negligence, the distinction
between strict liability claims and negligence or intent is minimal in
many respects. First, the move to strict liability in products liability
was, in part, precipitated by a recognition that negligence is the
cause of many products-related harms, but proving negligence in this
context is difficult even when negligence exists.s5 Thus, the move to
strict liability is a choice to assume that the manufacturer is
negligent, and avoid requiring painstaking proof of negligence or
potentially allowing the erroneous rejection of claims with merit.
Second, although negligence is not explicitly required to sustain
a products liability claim, a calculus similar to that involved in
assessing negligence has gradually been incorporated into products
liability. For instance, determining whether a product suffers from a
design defect involves a balancing test that is roughly parallel to
Judge Learned Hand's famous risk-utility formula for negligence.S6
With negligence, the analysis is whether the burden is less than the
probability of harm resulting, multiplied by the gravity of the harm.
Similarly, design defect claims weigh the likelihood that the
product's design will cause injury, the gravity of that injury, and the
mechanical and economic feasibility of improving the design. Little
apparent difference exists between the two tests other than their
adaptation to differing contexts; both balance the likelihood and
severity of harm against the cost of avoiding it. In addition, products
liability for manufacturing, design, and warning defects is anchored
Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1747-64
(1996).
84. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 620-21 (1992).
85. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426,
432 (Minn. 1971) C[I]n many cases proof of a defect may simply be a substitute word
for negligence."); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 435, 460-61 (1979) (indicating that strict liability for products may be a
"shortcut" to negligence that dispenses with long detailed trials over the issue of fault).
86. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 340. For further explanation of Learned Hand's
balancing test, see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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by the same fundamental concept found in negligence: the
foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.87
Although not as closely parallel to negligence as products
liability, the analysis for abnormally dangerous activities also
reflects negligence concepts. The analysis focuses on the risk that the
activity poses and whether the activity's value to the community
outweighs the danger posed.8s Thus, much like Learned Hand's test,
liability only follows if the burden caused by depriving the
community of the activity is outweighed by the danger that it
creates.89 Vicarious liability stands alone in not incorporating a risk-
utility balancing similar to negligence. However, this balancing is
unnecessary because the predicate for imposing liability is that the
employee has engaged in negligent or otherwise tortious conduct. In
short, all of the above forms of "strict liability" are, on some level,
grounded in weighing the costs, benefits, and unreasonableness of
harm that closely resembles negligence. Thus, strict liability causes
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). The Restatement (Third) of
Torts doesn't explicitly include the value to the community weighed against the
danger, but it retains the sentiment by focusing on the significance of the risk and
whether the activity common to the community. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Moreover, it
directly poses the traditional question in negligence of foreseeability of harm. Id.
Regardless, many courts continue to follow the Restatement (Second) on abnormally
dangerous products. See, e.g., Perez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 883 P.2d 424, 425 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994); Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466 (R.I. 1996);
Peneschi v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 1 (W. Va. 1982).
89. Nuisance claims, which are sometimes treated along with other strict liability
and abnormally dangerous activities, likewise begin with the issue of the harm or,
more precisely, with whether the interference with another's property is unreasonable.
However, in determining whether it is unreasonable, courts look at the
appropriateness of the location and the social utility of the activity. See, e.g., Martins
v. Interstate Power, Co., 652 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 2002) (stating that the location
and the purpose are considered when determining whether a particular use
constitutes a nuisance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979). Even though
some activity may interfere with neighbors' use and enjoyment of their land, an
activity with significant social value may nonetheless be exempt from a claim of
nuisance. Id. § 828 cmt. e. Public utilities such as water treatment and electrical and
nuclear plants may be the best example of how the utility of an activity can outweigh
its harm. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696-97
(Cal. 1996) (finding that the alleged harm would have to outweigh the social utility of
the activity complained of in order to grant relief against the defendant electric utility
company); Westchester Assoc., Inc. v. Boston Edison Co., 712 N.E.2d 1145, 1149 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1999) (finding that electromagnetic fields generated by an electric utility's
operation of power lines did not constitute a nuisance when they interfered with
computer monitors in an adjacent building); Borough of Collegeville v. Philadelphia
Suburban Water Co., 105 A.2d 722, 731 (Pa. 1954) (affirming a lower court's decision
not to enjoin the erection of a dam in part because "[tihe impounding of water for
public use is a necessity").
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of action are not conceptually divergent from the other fault-based
torts; they simply fall at a different point on the spectrum of liability.
A few additional discrete and less prevalent torts also exist.
These remaining torts generally require a higher mental state, such
as specific motive, recklessness, or wantonness.90 For instance,
malicious prosecution, defamation, injurious falsehoods, and
interference with economic value require a showing of motive.91 To
sustain a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant initiated legal proceedings against him, not merely by
mistake, negligence, or litigiousness, but because of ill motive or
illegitimate purpose. 92 Likewise, uttering or writing inaccurate or
false statements will not render a defendant liable for defamation or
injurious falsehoods so long as the subject matter of the statements
relates to issues of public concern, deals with public figures, or
relates to business.93 Instead, a plaintiff must show the defendant
acted with malice or reckless disregard for the truth.
The justification for a higher mens rea in these cases is not
based on a concept of fault, but rather is primarily a factor of cost-
utility balancing, which must account for the inherent social utility
and value of the challenged activity. When individuals speak about
public matters or figures, they exercise their First Amendment
rights, which counterbalance a plaintiffs right to vindication.94 As
one of the most valued constitutional rights, the legal standard for
defamatory or speech-based torts simply imbeds this weight into the
prima facie case by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a more
egregious and unjustified harm. Similarly, claims of injurious
falsehoods occur in the competitive marketplace, and the higher
90. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 31, at 52 n.5 (discussing examples of statutes or
cases requiring higher levels of intent or carelessness).
91. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring proof of
"actual malice" or reckless disregard for the truth in a defamation claim);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977) (stating that improper purpose is an
element of a malicious prosecution case); id. § 767 (1979) (suggesting that good or
socially desirable motives would excuse interference with economic interests or
contract).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
93. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 281-82 (stating the limits of liability when an
individual comments on issues of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974) (establishing the limits of liability when an individual comments on public
officials and figures); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977) (requiring not
only that a statement be false and cause injury to a plaintiff, but that the defendant
also know that it was false or act with reckless disregard for the truth).
94. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269.
[Vol. 60:2
2008] FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEXT CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 279
standard these plaintiffs must overcome reflects the high value our
system places on economic competition.95
The breadth and variance within the above spectrum of torts
demonstrates that no inherent, consistent, or agreed upon form of
fault exists to necessarily justify forcing one individual to compensate
another. "Fault" is simply a choice about where to situate liability,
and, hence, a legal construct rather than a normative concept. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded, a "common ground at the bottom
of all liability in tort" is "very hard to find"96 because "[t]he law did
not begin with a theory"97 and did not develop a coherent one later.
Instead, the common law of torts reflects tendencies,9s and even the
tendencies can diverge at times.99 In short, the law does not create
prohibitions based on an inherent form of fault. "What the law really
forbids, and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of
the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise."100
Today, however, conceptualizing fault and liability as mere
reflections of our choices may seem counterintuitive because of the
regular reliance on "fault" and "no-fault" as categories of torts. A
collective review of the various fault standards-ranging from
malice, intent, recklessness, and negligence to strict liability-
demonstrates that no normative foundation, single mental state, or
fault concept connects and justifies liability across torts. Insofar as
all of them involve some level of mens rea or knowing acts, one might
argue that this is a normative basis for inferring fault. However,
reducing the level of knowledge to the point where it is common to all
torts would render the commonality so basic as to be meaningless; it
would only be the knowledge that one is engaging in a particular
activity. Thus, no conscious level of wrongdoing extends across tort.
For instance, conscious wrongdoing might exist in many
intentional and malice-based torts, but conscious wrongdoing does
not exist in negligence. Except in those rare instances where
negligence is gross, justifies punitive damages, or poses a very grave
risk, the typical negligent defendant does not engage in conscious
wrongdoing. The defendant acts consciously, but lacks a purpose to
cause harm or to create a risk of harm. Similarly, in strict liability
cases, although a defendant may choose to engage in an activity that
can cause serious harm, no conscious wrongdoing exists. In fact, the
95. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 31, at 1277; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora
Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979).
96. HOLMES, supra note 70, at 77.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 78.
99. Id. (discussing how the tendency to impose liability for voluntary choices is
tempered by the separation consideration of foreseeability).
100. Id. at 110.
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likelihood of harm may seem low to the defendant, and the defendant
may take all possible precautions to prevent it. Nonetheless, the law
will impose strict liability on the defendant if the harm occurs.101
In short, the more one scrutinizes and attempts to categorize
torts, the more fault, or any other culpability concept used as a basis
for liability, dissolves. As Kenneth Simons concludes in his expansive
evaluation of mental states, the various mental states and differing
liability standards are not constructed on any concept of fault or legal
hierarchy;102 rather, they are constructed to further policy and social
objectives. Thus, liability standards do not make judgments
regarding fault.
C. Negligence's Disregard for "Fault" in Imposing and
Alleviating Liability
1. Objective Standards
A normative concept of fault is nonexistent even in torts' major
category of negligence. Negligence law regularly casts the relevance
of "fault" or "culpability" aside. Negligence's basic inquiry into
whether conduct creates a foreseeable risk of harm implies a concern
with fault. However, the evaluation of foreseeability from an
objective and theoretical reasonableness starfdard ignores individual
predilections, 103 allowing liability to extend beyond the actual
subjective negligence of individuals. Negligence requires everyone to
conform to a single standard of care, which generally takes no
account of the internal temperaments, intellect, education, or
physical abilities of individuals. Consequently, a generally weaker
man, although acting with the utmost care, can be liable for his
inability to conform his conduct to that of an average physically fit
man.104
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating that strict liability applies to those
engaging in abnormally dangerous activities "even when reasonable care is exercised
by all actors"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) ("One who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or
chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent the harm.").
102. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 464
(1992).
103. See Rabin, supra note 51, at 930.
104. Those with physical disabilities, such as the blind, are not expected to see the
same things that a person with normal vision would. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Gardner
Wholesale, Inc., 256 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 1972). However, they would be required to take
extra precaution in certain instances because of their knowledge of that disability.
Likewise, someone who has superior knowledge of a danger is expected to act with the
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Holding the physically weaker man liable is justified because the
effects of his acts are no less harmful than those of other men.
Moreover, an objective standard is the only one legally manageable,
but the justification cannot be that the impaired man acted with
fault or is "blameworthy." Similarly, negligence is not based on
emotions, motives, or other subjective criteria that might reflect fault
or culpability.105 This type of evidence is simply irrelevant to
negligence. Although some men certainly act carelessly and are
blameworthy, the conclusion that one is inherently or subjectively at
"fault" or "careless" does not follow from the legal finding of
negligence. The law only assesses whether one has crossed a
preestablished line as to what is acceptable conduct.106 In this
respect, negligence is shockingly similar to strict liability. The
disregard for personal subjectivity in negligence reveals that, similar
to strict liability, it is not based on a normative concept of fault or
culpability.
In addition, the courts' ad hoc application of and divergence from
the general negligence standard undermines any alignment between
negligence and normative fault. For instance, for certain classes of
individuals, such as minors and physically disabled individuals,
courts look beyond outward conduct to subjective capacities, and
effectively apply a lower standard of care than the objective one.10 7
Yet, in contrast, courts refuse to afford any leniency to mentally ill
individuals who lack knowledge and foresight regarding risks, or to
consider their capacity when evaluating their conduct.108 In fact,
courts would hold them liable even though it may be impossible for
mentally ill individuals to elevate their conduct to that of the
objective reasonable person. The conflicting treatment of these
groups reveals that negligence standards cannot be reconciled with a
normative concept of fault. Recognizing the inconsistencies, some
courts admit that the disparate treatment is driven by policy rather
than fault considerations.109
care that a reasonably prudent person would if he or she possessed such superior
knowledge.
105. See HOLMES, supra note 70, at 110.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Shepherd, 256 So. 2d at 882; see also Wilson v. Sibert, 535 P.2d 1034
(Alaska 1975) (taking special account of emergency circumstances in evaluating
reasonable conduct).
108. See Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM.
J. JURIS. 179, 180 (2003) ("[The law of negligence stead-fastly refuses to take into
account the limitations of the mentally ill: the standard for judging whether the
mentally ill actor's conduct was negligent is the conduct of the reasonably prudent
sane person, and that standard is applied even when the actor was suddenly stricken
by an unforeseeable mental illness.").
109. See, e.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 2000).
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By imposing a higher standard on mentally incompetent
individuals, courts hope to encourage family members and social
networks to take responsibility for the individuals.10 This
encouragement serves an important purpose, since individuals with
diminished mental capacities may be more likely to unintentionally
cause harm to others."' These rationales, however, are irrelevant to
any concept of fault. They simply reveal that courts tend to exercise
and withhold leniency based on social utility and harm, rather than
fault. This concern with social utility and harm might also explain
those instances where courts diverge from their general willingness
to afford children a relaxed standard of care. When minors engage in
adult activities or operate dangerous instrumentalities, courts hold
them to an adult standard-not because the minors are suddenly at
fault under these circumstances, but because their activities create
significant risks to others.112
2. Prima Facie Case of Negligence
The disregard for "fault" becomes even clearer when one closely
examines the prima facie elements of negligence. To establish a claim
of negligence, a plaintiff must not only demonstrate that a defendant
engaged in negligent conduct that led to injury, but he must also
establish duty, damages, actual cause, and proximate cause. These
additional requirements "rob" the "fault principle. . . of any sensible
meaning, because key elements in a negligence case having nothing
to do with breach of due care-particularly, the duty question-
frequently are determinative of major categories of injury claims."113
For instance, an excavation company might dig craters on a worksite
and be aware that deep pools of water formed in them, but when a
person later comes onto the site, falls into the crater, and drowns
while the company owner watches, the law would excuse the owner
for carelessly leaving the craters open or neglecting to warn of them
unless the victim can establish a duty owed to him.114
As an element of negligence, proximate cause similarly limits
liability. The basis for the limitation, however, is a policy
consideration, not the absence of fault.115 A person can breach a duty
of care and actually cause harm to someone, but tort law will only
hold the defendant is only liable if his conduct was the proximate
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Moreover, an adult has most likely enabled the minor in this activity and must
monitor that activity closely.
113. Rabin, supra note 51, at 932.
114. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
115. See Rabin, supra note 51, at 957-58.
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cause of the injury. Proximate cause relies on the narrowing concept
of foreseeability to achieve this end. A defendant is not liable for his
careless conduct if harming the particular plaintiff was
"unforeseeable." A defendant, however, could engage in the same
careless conduct and be subject to unlimited damages if the initial
harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable.116 More particularly, the law
would hold a man who negligently bumps his car into another liable
for minor physical injuries resulting from the bump because jolting
someone in the car is foreseeable. But relying on a proximate cause
analysis, the defendant would not be liable for the death of a man
standing next to a parked car who died as a result of the defendant
negligently crashing into the trunk of the car and igniting a gas can
inside of it because this harm was unforeseeable.
As Dobbs writes, proximate cause is among those rules that
"seek to impose limits on liability for conduct that would otherwise be
considered negligent."117 The harsh reality is that "the line against
liability must be drawn somewhere and ... proximate cause rules
reflect the effort courts make to draw that line."11s The courts draw
that line based on social objectives and utility. Thus, proximate cause
is inherently a policy question of what the scope of a person's liability
"should be," not whether the person was at fault.119 In short, the
basic standards in tort law's major category of negligence
demonstrate that individual fault, even if it could be fairly said to
exist, is not determinative of liability. Courts are willing to disregard
a defendant's fault and alleviate liability in some instances and, in
others, to impose liability notwithstanding the lack of subjective
culpability or "fault."
116. For instance, a simple car accident could lead to liability for the accident itself,
lost wages of a corporate executive, and loss of consortium, among other things.
117. DoBBS, supra note 31, at 443 n.2.
118. Id. at 445. Dobbs points out that proximate cause can be conceived of as more
than merely a practical limitation. Id. at 446. Judgments about proximate cause are
also an attempt to "limit liability to the reasons for imposing liability in the first place"
and, hence, are a mere corollary to negligence rules. Id. However, that rationalization
can quickly become circular when one probes the notion that proximate cause is simply
an indirect mechanism for establishing no duty where a duty would otherwise exist.
See Rabin, supra note 51, at 957; see also id. at 936-49 (discussing various indirect
measures by which to establish no duty). Consequently, proximate cause can shape
what one's duty is or is not.
119. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) ("[Proximate cause means] that, because of convenience, of public policy, of
a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.").
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3. Exceptions to the Duty of Reasonable Care
Finally, even when all the above elements of negligence are met,
courts are still willing to disregard the negligent or "faulty" conduct
of certain classes of defendants. The most prominent example of this
exception to negligence (and some intentional tort rules) is
governmental immunity.120 Courts and commentators attempt to
rationalize the exception by articulating government immunity as
merely a formalization of the traditional rule that a government or
monarchy has no legal duty toward citizens and, hence, no duty that
it can breach or discharge negligently.121 However, that the rule is
founded on tradition does not distinguish its continuation from any
other exception, particularly in light of a purported all-encompassing
standard of care that negligence is intended to embody. The
elimination of liability for negligent conduct, whatever the reason, is
nothing less than an exemption and a divergence from the duty to
exercise reasonable care.
The application of general negligence rules to any number of
government actions makes this clear. For instance, consider a police
department that tells a homeowner to lock himself in the basement
during a robbery because it is dispatching officers immediately, but
never actually does. The department is no less negligent when that
owner is killed than is the landlord who tells a renter the same, but
does not bother to call the police at all. Yet, governmental immunity
would exclude liability against the police department, while liability
is imposed on the landlord.122 Although more curtailed now, the law
has also recognized similar immunities for the negligent activities of
charitable organizations.123 Thus, the availability of immunities to
eliminate liability for negligent conduct again demonstrates that
120. In fact, the distinction between governmental immunity and privilege is
largely one of semantics today. A privilege formerly meant that, based on the
circumstances, the activity was nontortious, whereas the immunity allowed that the
conduct was tortious, but the immunity simply defeated liability. See, e.g., DAN B.
DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 82-100 (5th ed. 2005) (analyzing
defenses to intentional torts as privileges that justify the defendants' particular
conduct); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 637 (1999) (using the terms "privilege" and
"immunity" interchangeably); see also id. at 611 (contrasting between defenses or
privileges based on a defendant's conduct and immunities that simply excuse a
defendant for his tortuous conduct).
121. Mark C. Niles, "Nothing But Mischief" The Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1349-50 (2002) (discussing
Comm'rs of State Ins. Fund v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 549, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
which indicated that the plaintiffs case did not lack evidence of negligence, but was
doomed by the fact that the defendant was the United States itself, and because of the
policy of sovereign immunity).
122. See, e.g., De Long v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1983).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 14503 (2006).
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fault is neither determinative of liability, nor a normative concept in
tort.
Traditionally, the courts also carved out an expansive divergence
from negligence for careless landowners. From the outset of
negligence, courts crafted legalisms to hold landowners blameless for
their negligence. In particular, courts categorized entrants upon an
owner's land as invitees, licensees, or trespassers.124 Owners owed
invitees a duty of reasonable care, but an owner needed only to avoid
intentional, wanton, and willful conduct toward licensees-possibly
the most common category-and trespassers.125 Thus, although an
application of negligence standards might indicate that an owner was
at fault in injuring a licensee, courts excused the owner from
liability.26 In effect, the right and privilege of landowners to use
their property as they saw fit superseded the duty of reasonable
care,127 again demonstrating that neither fault, intent, negligence,
nor any other standard is a normative measure of whether to impose
liability. Rather, as with immunities and other divergences discussed
above, the leniency toward landowners demonstrates that
considerations other than fault account for why the law does or does
not impose liability in various contexts.
Once one understands that negligence is not a reflection of fault,
it becomes difficult to determine where liability should begin or end.
As Robert Rabin's scholarship on the fault principle reveals, even the
most esteemed tort commentators have struggled to establish why
civil liability should be limited only to negligent acts.128 For example,
Rabin finds that Holmes essentially conceded the irrelevance of fault,
as Holmes's justification for the limitation of liability to negligence
was simply that the limitation was necessary to encourage and
protect freedom of action, and minimize the law's intrusion.129 This
reasoning is questionable. When economic incentives are accounted
for, liability based on negligence and strict liability are the same in
terms of their capacity to change or infringe on freedom of action."30
124. See, e.g., Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 662 N.E.2d 287, 291
(Ohio 1996). As to trespassers and licensees, the owner's only duty is to refrain from
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct that is likely to injure. Id. at 293. The owner has
no duty to anticipate or prevent the presence of licencees or trespassers, or dangers to
them. Id. Only as to invitees is there any duty of reasonable care. Id.
125. Id. at 293.
126. Moreover, this was the case even though the landowner was in a better
position than the licensee to protect against the harm that the licensee suffered. See
Rabin supra note 51, at 934-35 (discussing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal.
1968)).
127. Rabin, supra note 51, at 935-36.
128. Id. at 928-33.
129. Id. at 929-30.
130. See id.
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With both, the defendant will only alter his conduct to avoid harm
when the cost of doing so is marginally less than compensating
victims for the harm.131 Realizing the odd similarity between the
purportedly distinct concepts of negligence and strict liability, Guido
Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff, in effect, push the irrelevance of fault
one step further.132 They argue that the question in tort is not
whether imposing strict liability is appropriate; "[t]he issue is just
where strict liability should stop."133
The answer is that liability simply starts and stops, not where
fault dictates, but where society dictates. Holmes justifies using
objective, yet arbitrary, standards as a basis for liability as being
"necessary to the general welfare."34 More generally, tort liability
begins and ends based upon our social objectives, not the false notion
that some inherent fault or responsibility exists.135 Thus, throughout
the history of torts, "fault," negligence, and intent have all been
ignored, adopted, limited, or excepted when necessary to further
some other goal.136 Negligence, intent, or any other concept of "fault"
one might employ are but means to some other end, rather than
independently significant principles to which we must adhere. The
only remaining issue is to ascertain what ends these means are
intended to serve.
III. TORT LIABILITY STANDARDS AS MEANS TO ACHIEVE SOCIETAL
GOALs
Our societal values, goals, and purposes explain our choices in
regard to liability standards. Of course, no single value or goal
explains the adoption of all standards because our values and goals
are not static. They have varied across time and context, inevitably
producing as many bases of liability as there are different values,
purposes, or notions of justice.137 The consistent and constant pursuit
of a social value or goal does, however, explain why our courts or
legislatures ultimately adopt a particular standard.138 Thus, the
applicable liability standard in a particular context is a reflection of
131. Id. at 931.
132. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
133. Id. at 1056.
134. HOLMES, supra note 70, at 108.
135. See Rabin, supra note 51, at 928-33.
136. See id.
137. See ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 255 (4th ed. 1995).
138. See Simons, supra note 102, at 522 (concluding, in an analysis of mens rea and
fault concepts across all areas of the law, that "the normative purposes of legal rules
generally provide the most compelling explanation for the law's choice of particular
mental state categories .... ").
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the goal or value that society seeks, rather than some inherent notion
of fault or blameworthiness. Moreover, a full understanding of the
reasons for choosing a particular fault or liability standard can only
come from exploring the social values, purposes, and concepts of
fairness or justice that motivate the choice.39 In short, tort liability
standards are an attempt to order society as we see fit or as times
necessitate.140
In shaping tort standards, we have an expectation of achieving a
given goal, and a particular mens rea, fault, or liability standard has
worth only insofar as it achieves that goal.141 Hence, the correct
approach to evaluating a particular standard is not whether it is a
"good" standard or reflects the blame, fault, or culpability of a
defendant, but whether it produces results consistent with the
desired social end. When a particular standard does not produce
those desired results, the standard is simply modified or an exception
is created.
This lesson has been at play throughout the history of torts. The
general rules of negligence and intent, for instance, were originally
constructed on social norms. Battery is measured from what a
reasonable person would find offensive, which is a reflection of social
norms. 142 Likewise, in its earliest forms, negligence was determined
largely by social customs.14 3 The breach of customs, which evolve
through a process of accommodating social acceptability and
efficiency, was a basis for deeming conduct negligent.144 However, no
rule of intent or negligence perfectly serves social ends and, thus, the
rules have exceptions and defenses. Like the general rule itself, the
courts have consistently recognized exceptions when necessary to
permit socially valuable or acceptable behavior. 145
The evolution of products liability also demonstrates the creation
and subsequent modification of liability rules to serve social goals.
Once injury prevention became a primary goal of tort liability for
consumer products, and negligence standards proved insufficient to
ensure that end,146 the liability standard moved away from an
139. RABIN, supra note 137, at 255.
140. See supra Part II. As a leading commentator has noted, what is often missing
from torts courses is an analysis and discussion of the "historical, moral, and economic
values that liability rules." RABIN, supra note 137, at xii.
141. See Simons, supra note 102, at 466.
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18-19 (1965).
143. See id. §§ 282-83.
144. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 39 (1972).
145. See Simons, supra note 102, at 493-94.
146. See Derrick Williams, Secondhand Jurisprudence in Need of Legislative
Repair: The Application of Strict Liability to Commercial Sellers of Used Goods, 9 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 255, 280 (2003).
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inquiry of negligent conduct to one that focused primarily on
harms.147 By attaching liability based on harm, the law would
encourage manufacturers to create safer products and, hence, further
the goal of injury prevention.148 Yet, the focus on harm eventually
imposed too high a burden on business because it failed to account
for the actual cost, and the potential impossibility or impracticability,
of altering products.49 Had the sole goal been injury compensation,
the harm-focused rule would have remained appropriate, as the rule
would have achieved no more or less than the goal. The harm-focused
standard, however, imposed liability beyond what was necessary to
further injury prevention because it compensated victims regardless
of the safety alternatives that were available to manufacturers and
retailers.
As a result, products liability reverted to a less aggressive
standard that blended negligence concepts with the previous harm-
focused standard. As discussed earlier, design defect analysis still
begins with an assessment of the harm suffered by consumers, but
the standards also include a cost-benefit analysis that only imposes
liability when it makes technological and economic sense to do so. 150
Similarly, the failure to include a warning on a product initially
rendered a product defective if a warning could have reduced or
avoided a foreseeable harm.151 This standard created the wide
potential for liability. Thus, to avoid liability, manufacturers began
offering extensive warnings of any and all possible dangers
Forcing injured consumers to sue under the negligence theory would
inevitably lead to less product liability suits in this area... The duty of
reasonable care does not deter used goods dealers from selling defective
products, and even if it did, used goods dealers can relatively easily prove
that they satisfied the duty ....
Id.
147. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (stating that the costs of injury from defective consumer products should
be borne by manufacturers irrespective of negligent conduct).
148. Williams, supra note 146, at 280 (discussing how strict liability for harm better
protects consumers from injury from defective secondhand commercial products).
149. Id. at 257 ('[A]pplying strict liability to commercial sellers of used products,
while facilitating compensation to injured victims, poses substantial problems for
commercial sellers who are unable to pay large damage awards and implement
procedures to prevent product-related injuries in the future.").
150. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 31, at 997-99 (explaining what a plaintiff must
prove to establish a design defect); Honda of Am. Mfg. Inc. v. Norman, 104 S.W.3d 600
(Tex. App. 2003).
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998); see also
Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 725-26 (D.C. 1985) ("Under both a
negligence and a strict liability theory, the manufacturer has an obligation to
anticipate reasonably foreseeable risks of harm arising in the course of proper use, and
to warn of those risks.') (citations omitted).
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associated with a given product, regardless of the likelihood or
severity of injury.152 These extensive warnings rendered many
important warnings useless because the product or warning
pamphlets became so cluttered that consumers no longer bothered to
read them in their entirety or were unable to identify the
comparative significance of warnings.153 Consequently, the standards
for warning defects were narrowed to reduce manufacturers'
incentives for cluttering their products with warnings and to increase
their incentive for communicating effective warnings.54 Again, the
desired result was to increase injury prevention. In short, the courts
adopted, amended, and applied products liability rules, not based on
an inherent notion of fault or culpability, but based on what rules
produced results consistent with societal goals.
One of the most dominant goals of tort law has been to foster
social utility.155 Fostering social utility entails producing results or
systems that are the most beneficial for the most people. As Dobbs
states, "it bases tort law on social policy or a good-for-all-of-us
view."156 This is in contrast to a legal system that seeks to produce
justice for the individual, regardless of whether it produces efficient
results overall.157 To produce "good" results for society as a whole,
social utility theories eschew rules that merely address the interests
of individuals.
The means of achieving social utility, of course, vary. Creating a
set of rules that effectively spreads the cost-burden of injuries across
industries and communities rather than individuals, to make
compensating all victims affordable, is one way of achieving social
utility.158 Using the law to deter certain conduct, encourage other
152. See Mark R. Lehto & James M. Miller, The Effectiveness of Warning Labels, in
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1989: WARNINGS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND RECALLS 169 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 379, 1989).
153. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from
the "Need to Know"About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 381-91
(1994) (discussing the possibility that the proliferation of warnings in general may
weaken the impact of truly necessary warnings).
154. Schwartz, supra note 84, at 687-91.
155. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 878 (2004) (noting social utility as
one of two dominant purposes of tort); Richard Posner, The Concept of Corrective
Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEG. STUDIES 187 (1981) (positing social
utility as a dominant purpose of tort law).
156. DOBBS, supra note 31, at 12.
157. Id.
158. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1965).
"[C]ompensation" as an aim means only that it is deemed more desirable for
persons other than the injured to pay the costs of the injury. This is because
if many pay the cost of an accident rather than one.., the social dislocation
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conduct, and consequently prevent future injuries is another way of
achieving social utility. In either instance, the law's purpose would
not be to identify "fault," but to increase safety and compensate
harm. If the law only punishes "fault," some injuries that could have
been prevented will continue to occur because the defendant has no
incentive to alter his conduct. 159 Moreover, individuals will be left to
shoulder the entire burden of the harm.
By balancing the burdens and benefits, many tort analyses
imbed the pursuit of social utility and goals into the very fabric of
their liability standards. The weighing of costs and burdens
associated with negligence and products liability standards are
inherently a method through which the law balances a diverse and
competing set of social, economic, and political goals.160 A decision in
any given case prefers one interest over another or requires one to
mitigate its effects on the other. However, social utility and values
are also a factor in torts that do not explicitly balance burdens and
benefits.
For instance, on a less obvious level, the liability of land owners
has varied with numerous attempts to balance the interests of land
rights and the harm to third parties. Historically, court decisions
reflected the notion that furthering land interests was a foremost
social value by determining that a land owner's interest trumped a
court's compliance with the negligence standard.161 In addition, the
exceptions to a land owner's duties could vary depending on
geographic location. Geographic variations are consistent with a
balancing of interests theory because land was suited, or ill-suited,
for particular uses depending on geographic locations, which caused
land's value and utility to vary. 162 Thus, a land owner's duty in
costs of the accident may be reduced; this is the basis of the theory of loss
spreading.... For when those who are "more able to pay" pay, we believe
that fewer secondary undesirable effects will occur.
Id.
159. Interestingly, implicit in these foregoing concepts of utility is also an even
deeper value-based decision about whom should benefit from the law and how much.
As Calabresi and Hirschoff point out in their analysis of the development of strict
liability, societal preferences over how to distribute wealth among groups are "crucial
to the choice of liability rules." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 132, at 1080. For
instance, modern products liability and worker's compensation law is a decision
regarding the relative powerlessness of average consumers and workers, and an effort
to shift the power of the law to their advantage.
160. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the
Common Law of Tort, 31 LA. L. REV 1, 27 (1970).
161. See supra notes 124-27.
162. For example, Missouri has enacted laws requiring that all fields where animals
are kept be fenced and has defined what constitutes a "fence" under the statue. Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 272.010, 272.020 (2007). Similar laws have been in place since 1808 to
protect landowners from damage caused by trespassing cattle and other grazing
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regard to fencing in his animals in rural states would differ from
more urbanized or industrial states.
The modern willingness to impose a higher duty of care on land
owners reflects a change in the concept of social utility from one
grounded in land interests to one premised, among other things, on
the need to reduce avoidable injuries.163 In the end, a concept of
social utility, whatever it may be, always has the final say in
dictating liability standards. The varying factor is what specific
social utility concept we wish to pursue in a given context, which is
always a reflection of our judgment of how best to order society.
In fact, the entire evolution of tort law is but one long example of
liability shifting to promote social values or needs, however one
chooses to define them. The current spectrum of tort liability and the
variance of liability across time are explained by tort's efforts to
respond to social needs. Almost every major expansion or contraction
of tort law reinforces this notion.
Tort, as an independent body of law, grew out of property and
contract law because they were unable to effectively address the
increasing complexities and injuries in society.164 Likewise, the
earliest form of tort was disinterested in identifying and correcting
what one might call fault; rather, its purpose was to ward off
vigilantism, feuds, and revenge for harms one might suffer.165 Thus,
tort liability was evoked to serve a social end.166
animals. Craig R. Heidemann, Fencing Laws in Missouri: Confusion, Conflict,
Ambiguity and a Need for Change, 63 MO. L. REV. 537, 540 (1998). Similarly, Iowa
maintains a fence law requiring that "[t]he respective owners of adjoining tracts of
land shall upon written request of either owner be compelled to erect and maintain
partition fences, or contribute thereto, and keep the same in good repair throughout
the year." IOWA CODE § 359A.1A (2007); see also David S. Steward, Note, Iowa
Agricultural Fence Law: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 709
(1995) (discussing the theories behind Iowa fence laws). However, some states, seeing
value in the free grazing of animals, require land owners to fence animals out if they
do not want animals on their land. COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-46-101 (2007); DOBBS, supra
note 31, at 943.
163. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation
of Tort Law in New York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117, 194-202 (1999).
164. See generally Rabin, supra note 51, at 945; DOBBS, supra note 31, at 5-8
(discussing the relationship of torts to contract and property).
165. HOLMES, supra note 70, at 34.
166. Holmes did argue that strict liability without fault offended his sense of justice.
Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1733 (1981). Others likewise added that strict
liability was immoral. Id. at 1734. Such critiques suggest that, at least for some,
morality is intertwined with tort liability. Yet, Holmes admittedly found it difficult to
establish any norm at work behind tort liability, much less a moral principle. HOLMES,
supra note 70, at 77-80. Instead, it seems more accurate to recognize that some of our
social goals, such as fairness, reparation for harm, or reasonableness, intersect with
morality and, hence, might appear as moral or normative fault principles. However,
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This trend resurfaced over and over again. Tort expanded
beyond trespass and strict liability to include "trespass on the case"
because the initial causes of action were too simplistic to address the
varying ways in which people injure one another.167 Tort also created
arbitrary expansions of liability to impose absolute duties on
"common carriers" and those engaging in occupations termed "public
occupations."168 Because society and its members placed significant
trust in these entities and industries, the law had to ensure society
would be protected against the injuries they caused.
The next major expansion occurred in the form of negligence,
significantly increasing the spectrum of compensable harms while at
the same time requiring some limitation so as not to overly burden
infant industry.169 This limitation was achieved by recognizing
various defenses, such as assumption of the risk, no duty,
contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule.170 However, tort
was forced to expand again when society began consuming more
this intersection does not establish that any moral principle exists. Thus, the
argument that some forms of liability offend morals may be a more accurate critique
than that the liability offends reasonableness or fairness, for instance. See, e.g., George
P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539-40 (1972)
(arguing that reciprocity and reasonableness correlate with the moral foundation of
law).
167. Malone, supra note 160, at 19-22; see also DOBBS, supra note 31, at 259-62.
168. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-
Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1145-48 (1990) (discussing the common law
origins of, and policy justifications for, imposing strict liability on common carriers);
Rabin, supra note 51, at 944 (discussing the absolute duty of innkeepers and carriers,
who provided services to the public, to insure against injury to persons and goods).
169. See generally DOBBS, supra note 31, at 263-68; Stephen D. Sugarman, A
Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2403 (2000) (suggesting
that as a response to increased social concerns for fairness and cost-spreading, the
twentieth century saw an increase in the protections and remedies available to
negligence victims); John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J.
513, 519 (2003) (suggesting that twentieth-century changes in tort law were due to
political and social influences stemming from a growth in the industrial economy,
emphasizing physical injury and deemphasizing traditional torts like trespass).
170. See, e.g., Thomas v. German Gen. Benevolence Soc'y, 141 P. 1186 (Ca. 1914)
(applying the fellow servant rule to bar recovery); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Geiger, 167
So. 658 (Fla. 1936) (discussing the origins of contributory negligence as a bar to all
recovery); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959) (rejecting liability because
defendant owed no duty to plaintiff); Bolen v. Strange, 6 S.E.2d 466 (S.C. 1939)
(relying on assumption of the risk to bar recovery). The courts also simply refused to
recognize certain claims for emotional harm, even when the defendant had acted
negligently or intentionally. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y.
1896). Remnants of such limitations continue to persist today. See, e.g., City of Mobile
v. Taylor, 938 So. 2d 407 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Grube v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 886
P.2d 845 (Kan. 1994); Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005);
Jun Chi Guan v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, 24 A.D.3d 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Smalley v.
Friedman, Damiano & Smith Co., 873 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
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manufactured goods and the danger of those goods increased to
significant levels. In regard to consumer products, tort dispensed
with the need to prove negligence, replacing it with more plaintiff-
friendly standards.171 During recent decades, courts and legislatures
also curtailed defendants' ability to use contributory negligence and
the above-discussed defenses as means by which to defeat liability.172
All of these changes revolved around social forces and needs
amidst unique historical contexts. As society changed, so did its
needs, dangers, cultural customs, and goals. Tort law simply followed
these changes, attempting to create standards that reflected the
varying concepts of social value and utility. Ranging from
maintaining basic civility, protecting private property, and
encouraging economic expansion to compensating victims and
spreading costs, the goals of tort law reflect the constant attempt to
use tort liability to achieve a historically contingent notion of social
utility, progress, or efficiency.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LIABILITY STANDARDS
The Supreme Court's intentional discrimination standard is, by
many accounts, the most significant barrier to achieving racial equity
through legal advocacy.173 If Congress revisits the issues of
discrimination and equality anytime soon, the debate will likely
revolve around whether to replace or amend the intent doctrine with
a more plaintiff-friendly liability standard.74 The lessons provided by
tort law should frame this discussion and help remove it from
debates over wrongfulness, bias, or "fault."175 Before applying the tort
framework to antidiscrimination, however, it is helpful to understand
how the Court has approached liability standards for other
constitutional torts.
This context will provide further insight into the development of
the intent standard in the areas of equal protection and
antidiscrimination. In turn, this will provide a more solid basis upon
which to evaluate the standard. With due process, for instance, the
171. See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability
Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 889-95 (2002).
172. See DOBBS, supra note 31, at 504 ("By the 1980s, only four states-Alabama,
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia-had failed to adopt comparative negligence
rules. The overwhelming majority of American states thus now follow the general
system adopted in other common law and in the major civil law countries.").
173. See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 22; Freeman, supra note 22; Charles R. Lawrence,
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN L. REV. 317, 323 (1987).
174. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed Civil Rights
Act of 2004 and its inclusion of disparate impact as the proper proof of discrimination).
175. See discussion supra Part III.
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Court is rather explicit about the goals and results that its
jurisprudence should produce.176 In contrast, the Court is far from
explicit in the areas of equal protection and antidiscrimination.
Nonetheless, careful analysis can reveal some implicit goals.177 One
can then filter those goals through a tort framework to assess
whether the intent standard is, in fact, an appropriate liability
standard for antidiscrimination statutes.
A. The Context and Evolution of the Intentional Discrimination
Standard
The mens rea, fault, and liability standards for violations of
constitutional and civil rights vary, although across a smaller
spectrum than in torts. Few, if any, constitutional torts impose
liability under a plaintiff-friendly standard resembling that of strict
liability.17s Moreover, some require "higher" mens rea requirements,
like those found at the opposite end of the torts spectrum. 179 To
demonstrate a denial of equal protection based on race, for instance,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with a specifically
motivated intent,180 which, in terms of hierarchy, rests on a level
similar to the tort standards of reckless and wanton conduct or
motive.181 Other constitutional claims operate on a median-level
standard similar to the negligence standard of torts. For instance,
the Court has held that, under certain circumstances, establishing a
denial of due process would only require a form of negligent
conduct.182 When the Court revisited the standard in later cases, it
elevated it slightly to deliberate indifference.1s3
The Court's tendency in constitutional torts has been to adopt
stricter standards and limit liability. For instance, a police
department may be negligent in causing harm to a prisoner, but a
176. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
177. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
178. But see, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Congressional Enforcement of Affirmative
Democracy Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185, 211
n.125 (2005).
179. See generally Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 749 (2006).
180. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (requiring "invidious discriminatory purpose [as] a motivating factor").
181. See Simons, supra note 102, at 467.
182. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that negligent conduct,
such as the loss of a prisoner's hobby kit, could serve as the basis for a procedural due
process claim). But see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (holding that
negligent conduct is not sufficient to serve as a basis for a procedural or substantive
due process claim).
183. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (recognizing
the application of deliberate indifference in due process).
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denial of due process does not occur unless the department is
deliberately indifferent to the harm.184 The Court has rationalized
limiting liability in this way as being necessary to preserve deference
and respect toward municipalities and to avoid imposing affirmative
duties on them.185 Similarly, the Court's adoption of an intent
standard in discrimination elevated the mens rea standard above the
previous natural and foreseeable consequences standard and,
consequently, severely limited the potential liability of
government. 186
In regard to most constitutional and statutory civil rights, the
Court has been transparent in articulating goals and analyzing how
a standard does or does not achieve these goals. For instance, the
Court reasoned that the original intent of the Due Process Clause, a
major category of constitutional tort law, was only to prevent those
instances where one is "deprived" of due process, which entails an
affirmative deprivation of rights or abuse of power. 187 The Court has
also explained why a negligence standard is not appropriately
calibrated to those goals and how a different standard would be.188
Recognizing a claim for a mere negligent deprivation would impose
liability for unintended harms and losses, pose the risk of trivializing
the Constitution, and make the Constitution a font of state law
rather than a shield against serious state-imposed injuries.s9
Likewise, lower standards could permit government liability even
when the connection between the state and the injured person is
limited, and potentially stretch beyond preventing governmental
deprivations of due process.190 In this respect, the Court's analysis is
squarely focused on the results and whether they further the goals of
due process, which reflects a torts rather than fault-based approach
to setting standards. Unfortunately, the Court's precedent has not
offered this level of transparency in regard to the intentional
discrimination standard.
The Court first implemented the intentional race discrimination
standard in equal protection cases and later summarily applied the
same standard to statutory claims of discrimination under Title VI of
184. See, e.g., Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriffs Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1306 & n.5,
1309 (11th Cir. 2003) ("In this non-custodial setting, a substantive due process
violation would, at the very least, require a showing of deliberate indifference to an
extremely great risk of serious injury to someone in Plaintiffs' position.").
185. See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
694-95 (1978).
186. Simons, supra note 102, at 524.
187. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 328-32.
190. Id. at 332-33.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964-the major vehicle used by plaintiffs to
challenge acts of public or publicly funded entities.191 The Court's
decisions do not explain the goals of equal protection or Title VI, or
why the intent standard is appropriate. Yet, the Court has been
particularly concerned with the results that the intent and other
standards would produce. This suggests that, although not
articulated, the Court did have a particular goal, value, or interest
that it sought to pursue. In this respect, it adheres to a general torts
framework in adopting standards. Nevertheless, the Court has
incorrectly placed notions of fault or wrongfulness at odds with this
torts framework, and ultimately produced results that may even be
in conflict with its own goals. Moreover, insofar as the Court is
pursuing its own agenda or goals in antidiscrimination law, it has
usurped the judgment of Congress and the populace. Therefore, the
time has come for the president, Congress, and country to act to
correct the contradictions that have plagued the Court.
1. Keyes v. School District No. 1
The Court's initial adoption of the intent standard in Keyes v.
School District No. 1192 was conclusory at best. The Court was not
explicit in its adoption of the intent doctrine as a general
constitutional standard, but the Court's later opinions cite to Keyes
as a foundation for the intent standard.
Keyes was a school desegregation case in which the Court
announced, for the first time and without explanation, that
"plaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but
also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state
action."193 The state must possess a "purpose or intent to segregate,"
rather than simply engage in intentional action that results in
segregation.194 These sparse statements were the full extent of the
Court's explanation of the standard. The Court did not provide a
rationale, but flatly asserted that this distinction had been an
implicit deciding factor in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of
Education.95 Thus, the standard simply is.
The Court's failure to address results and goals in adopting the
standard is problematic because of its unquestionably massive
implications. Justice Powell, recognized the import of the standard
and critiqued its adoption at length.196 He argued that only by
191. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
192. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
193. Id. at 198.
194. Id. at 208.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 217-53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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misreading precedent could the majority extrapolate the notion that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach de facto segregation.197 By
his account, the Court's previous decisions had imposed an
affirmative duty on all schools to remedy segregation, including that
"which in large part did not result from historic, state-imposed de
jure segregation,"198 because "if one goes back far enough, it is
probable that all racial segregation, wherever occurring and whether
or not confined to the schools, has at some time been supported or
maintained by government action."199 Moreover, as "creatures of the
State .... whether the [school] segregation is state-created or state-
assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to
constitutional principle."200
Justice Powell also critiqued the intent standard's capacity to
produce results that were commensurate with the constitutional
right at stake.201 In his eyes, the plaintiffs had "the right not to be
compelled by state action to attend a segregated school system."202
This necessarily includes the opportunity to receive an equal
educational opportunity in an integrated school system. 203 The
Court's standard placed no significance on achieving this result and,
instead, proceeded with the implicit notion that fault inherently
exists in de jure segregation and does not exist in de facto
segregation. When viewed from the perspective of results, however,
this distinction is irrelevant because both forms of segregation are
countenanced by state action and have the same effect on children
regardless of motive.204 The majority opinion, nonetheless, permited
schools to subject children to the effects of de facto segregation, while
the Court would ameliorate those effects when they result from de
jure segregation. In this respect, Powell perceived the majority's
intent standard as devaluing the interests of black children: "[I]f our
national concern is for those who attend [segregated] schools, rather
than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than
present reality, we must recognize that the evil of operating separate
schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta."205
197. Id. at 222.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 228 n.12.
200. Id. at 227.
201. Id. at 225-26.
202. Id. at 225.
203. Id. at 225-26.
204. Id. at 234 n.16.
205. Id. at 219; see also BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 265 (1979) (providing a more lengthy explanation for
Powell's personal objections to the distinction and the earlier, more caustic versions of
his opinion).
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Finally, even assuming the Court's distinction was theoretically
justified, Powell queried whether it could achieve the results for
which it was purportedly designed. In his view, even when a
segregative purpose is present, "courts cannot fairly resolve" the
practical difficulty of substantiating subjective discrimination.206
Instead, courts will engage in "murky, subjective judgments,"207
leaving "inadequate assurance that minority children will not be
short-changed in the decisions of those entrusted with the
nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools."208
In short, Justice Powell argued that the standard simply does
not work effectively and cannot produce results consistent with equal
protection. He suggested that the primary questions to be examined
by the Court should be what results the standard produces and how
they affect the constitutional interests at stake. When balancing the
interests at stake, he found that an appropriate equal protection
standard would assess whether a state's actions had an integrative
effect.209 Such a standard would look to whether the state had
contributed to the maintenance of segregation and, thus, met the
state action requirement, rather than whether segregation was its
purpose. Yet, the majority ignored the effect, focusing only on the
subjective intent.
2. Washington v. Davis
Relying on Keyes, the Court in Washington v. Davis210 adopted
the intent doctrine as the standard for assessing all violations of
equal protection based on race.211 In Davis, the Court failed to
explain why the intent doctrine is the appropriate standard, but did
provide some analysis of the standard's requirements. Again, it
proceeded with the conclusory notion that the standard simply "is"
because it purportedly always "has" been. The Court stated that
"[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race."212
206. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 225.
207. Id. at 227.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
211. Davis involved the Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection by the
federal government. See id. However, the Court naturally applied the intent doctrine
one year later in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a Fourteenth Amendment case.
212. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. The Court also reasoned that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment has the same purpose. Id.
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It narrowed the meaning of discrimination further to include only
invidious, purposeful, or intentional discrimination.213
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not contain the word
"discrimination." The amendment's language is broader,
guaranteeing that no state shall deny an individual equal protection
under the law.214 No further narrowing concepts or explanations are
included.215 Therefore, to justify narrowing equal protection to a
prohibition solely on discrimination, and invidious discrimination in
particular, the Court focused its analysis exclusively on precedent
involving invidious discrimination.26 With the exception of Keyes,
however, the precedent used by the Court did not predicate its
analysis on the existence of invidious discrimination.27 Thus, Davis
provides no more of a rationale than any other case.
The Court did note that several court of appeals decisions
"impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue;
but... we are in disagreement."218 Unfortunately, the Court's
responsive disagreement lacked depth and attacked a straw man. In
particular, the Court wrote that it has "difficulty understanding how
a law" neutral on its face, but having a racially disparate impact, "is
nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any person ... equal
protection of the laws."'219 The Court asserted that it cannot
comprehend how the law in Davis could be discriminatory when the
government's stated purpose in enacting the policy was upgrading
the abilities of its employees.220
This approach by the Court conceptualized an equal protection
claim as having two requirements, rather than one. In addition to
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate an unequal opportunity or
benefit based on race, the Court required the plaintiff to demonstrate
a discriminatory purpose behind the inequity. Other courts and
commentators, however, do not find that the Court's invidious
discrimination requirement is necessary. Rather, a plaintiff need
only show that he was denied an equal opportunity or benefit based
on race. 221 They would assert that, similar to the point made earlier
213. Id. at 240
214. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
215. For a more in-depth discussion of the Equal Protection Clause's language,
meaning, and relevance to discrimination, see Black, supra note 32.
216. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-41.
217. See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90
VA. L. REV. 1537, 1565 (2004).
218. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 246.
221. Id. at 242-43 (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)); see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 244 n.11.
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regarding due process, a denial of equal protection can occur
notwithstanding the type of mens rea that accompanies it.222 Thus, to
fairly respond to the opposing argument, the Court would have to
relinquish, at least temporarily, its assumption that discriminatory
purpose is necessary to sustain an equal protection claim. It does not.
Second, the Court misstated, rather than responded to, the
opposing argument. The opposing argument has never been that
disparate impact alone should invalidate governmental action.
Evidence of disparate impact would merely require the government
to articulate a legitimate and necessary reason for employing a
criterion that causes disparate impact, particularly when a less
discriminatory alternative is available.223 Only when the impact is so
stark that no reason explains it other than race would impact alone
invalidate the law, and even the Court's intent cases concede liability
on this point.224 But the Court ignored the more nuanced application
of the impact standard in other circumstances and cautioned that the
impact standard would summarily invalidate a host of laws.225 In
short, the Court had "difficulty understanding" the standard because
it did not bother to address it properly.
Placing the doctrinal issue aside, the Court did provide two
primary objections to a disparate impact standard, both of which
relate to the results that standard would produce. As discussed
throughout this Article, the selection and appropriateness of a given
standard are measured by whether the results it would produce are
consistent with social goals, not an immutable concept of fault. The
Court acted consistently with this principle by focusing on results.
First, the Court concluded that a disparate impact standard would
result in "a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the
seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is
appropriate under the Constitution."226 Second, a disparate impact
standard "would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes."227
Although the Court was appropriately concerned with results, it
did not explain how or why such results would be inconsistent with
the goals of equal protection. In this respect, the Court's focus on
222. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
223. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977).
224. Id. at 266 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
225. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.
226. Id. at 247.
227. Id. at 248.
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results was not clearly connected to equal protection goals, which
suggests that the preference for these results may be a value choice
by the Court, rather than a constitutional imperative. The implicit
indication is simply that the government's burden in applying an
impact standard to justify its actions and the potential upheaval of
the status quo outweighs, in the Court's estimation, the burden that
the intent doctrine places on plaintiffs and the potential that
discrimination might go unremedied.
3. McCleskey v. Kemp
The Court's opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp228 further reflected a
results- and value-oriented approach in its choice and application of
standards. In McCleskey, a multivariable statistical analysis
demonstrated that racial bias played a significant role in Georgia's
death penalty system. 229 The Court did not question the statistics'
validity, but dismissed their relevance because they did not
conclusively demonstrate race played a role in McCleskey's
particular case. 230 Recognizing that in other contexts similar
statistics would shift the burden of proof to the state, the Court
nonetheless saw "impropriety [in] requiring prosecutors to defend
their decisions to seek death penalties."231 Thus, the Court concluded
that it must ensure that prosecutors retain "wide discretion."232
Finally, the Court emphasized that '"McCleskey's claim, taken to its
logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that
underlie our entire criminal justice system" and would open the door
to challenges of other criminal penalties as well.233
McCleskey's assertion, however, was not that disparate impact
itself created a claim, but that these particular disparities
demonstrate intentional discrimination.234 Consequently, the Court's
rejection of his claim is a further narrowing of the intent standard.
Application of the Court's previous iterations of the intent standard
would have warranted liability in McCleskey. However, recognizing
this liability would, in the Court's appraisal, undermine the entire
death penalty system and, quite possibly, other aspects of the
criminal justice system.235 Thus, the Court held that evidence of
systemic or widespread intentional discrimination is insufficient.236 A
228. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
229. Id. at 286-87.
230. Id. at 292-97.
231. Id. at 296.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 314-15.
234. Id. at 291-92.
235. See id. at 314-15.
236. Id. at 292-94.
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plaintiff must also demonstrate that discrimination occurred in his
individual case, which cannot be accomplished through the use of
statistics.237 In fact, the Court required individualized evidence that
would be unavailable absent admissions by the state. 238 The
unfortunate effect of this requirement is to sanction widespread bias
in the system.239 In this respect, the Court's holding appears driven
by a rejection of results that challenge the status quo, rather than by
an application of the intent standard. Again, attention to results is
appropriate, but the Court did not discuss those results in relation to
the purpose or goals of equal protection; instead, it simply found
them at odds with prosecutorial discretion and the penal system
status quo. Consequently, even more clearly than in Washington v.
Davis,240 the Court's motivation in adopting the intent standard was
the estimation that the burden of a more lenient standard on the
status quo outweighs the burden and harm that the narrower intent
standard imposes on minorities.
B. A Torts-Based Evaluation of Intent
From a tort liability framework, the most appropriate evaluation
of the intent doctrine is whether it produces results that reflect the
goals of equal protection and antidiscrimination legislation. As to
this issue, the Court's first flaw is suggesting that fault is relevant.241
The Court's analysis implicitly assumes that conscious racial animus
or purpose correlates with a form of normative fault and, thus,
justifies liability. Many previous critiques of the Court's racial equal
protection jurisprudence miss the significance of this point; they fail
to challenge the notion that there is some form of normative fault
that equal protection should remedy.242 Rather than challenging this
237. Id. at 293.
238. Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that defendants challenging their
death sentence must now prove "that impermissible considerations have actually
infected sentencing decisions").
239. See id. at 320-22.
240. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
241. Oppenheimer, supra note 23, at 925; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural
Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006)
(concluding that courts have rejected disparate impact standards because "actions
taken without a conscious intent to discriminate do not fit the paradigm of a fault-
based understanding of 'discrimination").
242. For instance, scholars make an important point when they demonstrate that
most discrimination is a result of subconscious biases, but the thrust of their argument
is still premised on a defendant having done something wrong: inappropriately relying
on subconscious racial biases. See generally Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995). See also Anita Bernstein, Treating
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normative approach, critics would simply argue that fault is broader
and includes unconscious bias and differential treatment. 243
Consequently, both the Court and its detractors premise liability on a
defendant having done something "wrong."244
Even those who critique the intent standard for the results it
produces do so from a normative or fault perspective, rather than
based on the goals of equal protection or antidiscrimination.245 Too
often they fail to connect their critique of the results to an evaluation
of the underlying goals the Court is pursuing. Many simply argue the
Court's protection of the status quo or failure to eliminate racial
segregation produces inequitable results.246 The intent standard, like
any other liability standard, however, is but a tool to achieve an end.
The relevant question is whether a standard's results are consistent
with the underlying law's goals and purpose. Consequently, the
critique of the intent standard and its natural results, needs
refocusing. The critique should first be directed at any inconsistency
between the Court's assumed purpose of equal protection or
antidiscrimination and the real purpose of equal protection and
antidiscrimination.247 However, insofar as the Court's goals of equal
protection and antidiscrimination are legitimate, no basis to
challenge the intent standard necessarily exists.
1. The Distraction of Fault/Morality in the Intentional
Discrimination Standard
The Court, unfortunately, does not acknowledge the primacy of
results in setting its equal protection standards. In fact, in many
respects, the Court's analysis indicates that it believes some type of
inherent fault exists in equal protection and that the intent doctrine
Sexual Harassment with Respect, Il1 HARV. L. REV. 446, 497-501 (1997) (questioning
whether discrimination can ever be proved without fault). Such a critique would not
necessarily challenge the fault-based approach of the Court. Professor Rutherglen,
however, astutely reveals that the arguments over the disparate impact and
intentional discrimination standards are ultimately fights over the meaning and goals
of equal protection. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the
Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006).
243. See, e.g., D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate
Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 772-78
(1987).
244. But see Oppenheimer, supra note 23, at 967-72 (concluding we would be better
off if we did not look for fault or moral wrongdoing in discrimination cases).
245. See Rutherglen, supra note 242, at 124-33 (1995).
246. Id.
247. Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction,
Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J.
409, 414-16 (1998) (noting the considerable scholarship devoted to critiquing the intent
doctrine).
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identifies it.248 First, the intent standard applied to equal protection
and antidiscrimination, unlike in torts, is not objective. Rather, it is a
subjective test focused on the defendant's motives.249 The search for
motive differs from objective intent in that it is fundamentally an
inquiry into the appropriateness, morality, or fault of a defendant's
decision. Some argue further that if the Court's actual purpose in the
intent standard was to limit liability, the Court could have achieved
the same result more directly through procedural, proof, or conduct
requirements.250 Its refusal to do so suggests an adoption of a motive-
based intent standard, premised on the perception of an inherent
moral or fault significance.251
Second, the Court's approach to disparate impact standards and
the manner of contrasting them with intent further suggests a fault
or moral consideration. For instance, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
the Court accepted disparate impact as a basis for concluding that
prohibited discrimination had occurred.252 Griggs specifically
identified and imposed liability for a type of discrimination that did
not entail malice or purpose. 253 However, in later cases, the Court
found that such discrimination-if the Court would even term it
discrimination-was not prohibited, and instead required racial
motive or purpose. 254 This move away from the Griggs standard, as
David Oppenheimer writes, was one premised on the notion that the
new standards would reflect "fault."255
This notion becomes more explicit in cases such as Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust.256 In Watson, the Court concluded that it
is inappropriate to hold a defendant liable for disparate impact alone
because the impact may be unintentional.257 The Court further
asserted that only under those circumstances where disparate
impacts are functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination has
248. Simons, supra note 102, at 480.
249. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1991).
250. See Simons, supra note 102, at 524-25.
251. See id.
252. 401 U.S. 424, 433-36 (1971).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) ("In
such 'disparate treatment' cases ... the plaintiff is required to prove that the
defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.") (citation omitted); Pers. Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ('Discriminatory purpose,' however, implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.") (citation
omitted); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977) ("[A]bsent a
discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful
employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences.").
255. Oppenheimer, supra note 23, at 925.
256. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
257. Id. at 987.
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the Court accepted a disparate impact standard as a measure of
liability.258 From this perspective, Title VII's impact standard is
merely a means to identify faulty intentional discrimination rather
than a prohibition against unjustified barriers for racial minorities,
which would not require either fault or improper motive by the
defendant. In fact, at least one commentator concludes that although
not stated, the Court was even concerned with intent in the Griggs
case. 25 9
This search for "fault" through the intent standard has become
more dominant over time. More recently, in Alexander v. Sandoval,
the Court concluded that a disparate impact standard in Title VI was
entirely inapposite from the type of discrimination Congress sought
to prohibit.260 The Court indicated that a disparate impact standard
prohibits activities that Title VI's prohibition would otherwise
permit.261 It perceived the intent standard as prohibiting faulty
conduct and a disparate impact standard as prohibiting perfectly
acceptable conduct.262 The Court, however, ignored the fact that,
regardless of motive, the defendant in Sandoval instituted policies
that predominantly deprived scores of racial and ethnic minorities
the benefit of a driver's license.263 In the Court's view, such harmful
acts are acceptable because the harm is accidental or only incidental
to some other purpose. 264
Such distinctions between intent and impact indicate that the
Court is aiming its equal protection and antidiscrimination
standards at what it deems morally objectionable conduct. Anything
short of that immoral conduct is acceptable and not prohibited. This
moral or fault-driven rationale for liability, however, simply lacks
justification. The Court fails to connect it to, or demonstrate how it
furthers, the goals of equal protection. Moreover, this rationale
misses the central wisdom of torts: the absence of moral
blameworthiness does not indicate a lack of legal responsibility.265
Rather, "good" people sometimes do "bad" things and produce results
inconsistent with our goals and social utility.266
258. Id.
259. Todd B. Adams, Environmental Justice and the Limits of Disparate Impact
Analysis, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 418-24 (1999).
260. 532 U.S. 275, 279-86 (2001).




265. Oppenheimer, supra note 23, at 971.
266. Id.
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2. Surmising Implicit Goals from the Practical Results of
the Intent Standard
The Court's focus on fault and morality, however, may be a
rhetorical rationalization of the intent standard, rather than the
actual reason for its adoption. Since Davis, the Court has been
particularly cognizant of the effects of its antidiscrimination and
equal protection holdings. Implicit in the Court's precedent is that
the Court is ultimately driven by whether the results correlate with a
set of goals, not whether fault exists.
On its face, the intent standard is designed to eliminate racial
animus. However, some would not concede that the Court is devoted
to this end, because a subjective intent doctrine is so difficult to
meet. 267 Nevertheless, the standard, at the very least, drives racial
animus and explicit prejudice underground. Beyond this, the intent
standard furthers a contentious set of goals that are at odds with
limiting racial harms and burdens. Most prominently, the standard
protects the status quo of inequality, including inequality in the
criminal justice system, racially isolated housing patterns, racially
isolated and inadequate schools, and various other structural
disparities in society.268 Moreover, the standard insulates the
unimpeded continuation of those inequities by governmental actors
from challenge.269 For the most part, the standard prevents courts
and plaintiffs from intruding in, second-guessing, or invalidating
267. See Black, supra note 32, at 537-42 (discussing, generally, the difficulty of
meeting the requirements of the intent standard and, specifically, the cases that
reason the same).
268. Id. at 572-74 (discussing Supreme Court cases regarding education that protect
and reinforce the status quo); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-98
(1987). In McCleskey, the evidence demonstrated that racial bias was systematically a
significant factor in the imposition of the death penalty throughout Georgia, id. at 287,
which would meet the Court's prior interpretation of the intent standard requirement
that race be shown to be a motivating factor in a decision. The weight of this evidence,
however, would have implicated the entire death penalty scheme in Georgia, as
McCleskey's claim of discrimination "challenges decisions at the heart of the State's
criminal justice system" and "extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing
process." Id. at 292. Other states would likewise be susceptible to challenge, as similar
statistics "are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." Id. at 312. Rather
than challenge the status quo, the Court elevated the intent standard, requiring the
defendant to show his particular jury acted discriminatorily, and further stated that it
would not make such an inference from statistics alone, regardless of their reliability.
Id. at 292, 297. The Court demanded such "smoking gun" evidence notwithstanding
that the evidence of racial bias in the system was one-sided. See generally id. at 308
n.29. In addition, the Court in Arlington Heights had indicated that smoking gun
evidence is not necessary and that courts must often make inferences of intentional
discrimination from circumstantial and statistical evidence. Vill. of Arlington Heights
v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
269. Black, supra note 32, at 572-73.
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governmental discretion in decision making.270 In addition, the intent
standard reflects a judgment that the government operates more
efficiently without the courts' intervention.271 In short, the intent
standard presents a generally insurmountable barrier for
plaintiffs272--even when discrimination may in fact exist-and, thus,
achieves what appears to be the implicit goal of maintaining the
status quo and governmental discretion by significantly limiting the
scope of potential liability.273
Protecting the status quo and governmental discretion, however,
does not come without a cost. The interests of racial minorities are
inevitably in tension with these goals. School desegregation cases, for
instance, presented various situations wherein the amelioration of
educational inequality for African American children was pitted
against the structure of school systems and white parents' choices
and preferences. Chief Justice Burger explicitly pointed out that
important "competing values" were at stake in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.274 Similarly, in Keyes, Justice
Powell recognized that such balancing was occurring and chided the
majority for abandoning its "concern ... for those who attend
[segregated] schools," so as to "perpetuat[e] a legalism rooted in
history rather than present reality."275
The conflict continued to arise in subsequent cases and
effectively became a decisive issue. In Milliken v. Bradley,276
intentionally discriminatory action at the local, state, and federal
level caused widespread de jure segregated schools, which nothing
short of a comprehensive metropolitan plan could cure. 277 Yet, the
Court almost exclusively focused its concern on maintaining "the
270. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
271. See, e.g., id. at 311-12; cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (stressing
the need to turn a school district back over to local authorities).
272. See Selmi, supra note 22, at 293-94; David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 965-68, 990-91 (1989). See generally
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991) (detailing empirical findings
that show a pattern of failing to infer discrimination).
273. See Simons, supra note 102, at 524.
274. 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971).
275. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 219 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 205, at
265 (providing a more lengthy explanation for Powell's personal objections to the
distinction and his earlier, more caustic versions of his opinion).
276. 418 U.S. 717, 738-40 (1974).
277. See id; Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 219-21 (6th Cir. 1973); Bradley v.
Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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structure of public education,"278 avoiding public opposition to "forced
integration,"279 and protecting what it found to be "innocent" whites
in the suburbs.280 Balancing these interests against those of African
American children, the Court disregarded the constitutional violation
and harm, and the precedential presumption in favor of remedying
the segregation.281 In fact, the Court shifted the burden onto the
victims to show that their remedy was justified by intentional
"interdistrict" segregative action,282 which ultimately allowed the
constitutional harm to go unremedied.2s3
Even in Title VII's employment discrimination standards, where
the statute explicitly identifies disparate impact as an appropriate
standard, the competing interests have motivated the Court to
curtail its effect. After initially endorsing a disparate impact
standard in Griggs,284 the Court consistently eroded it in cases that
followed. Griggs required evidence of job relatedness to justify a
disparate impact.285 Just two years later, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green2S6 weakened the disparate impact standard by allowing an
employer to escape liability by merely showing a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the disproportionate exclusion of
minorities.287 Later holdings also required plaintiffs to carry the
278. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742-43. The Court also expressed that no tradition in
public education was more deeply rooted than the value in local control and avoiding
judicial oversight. Id. at 741-44. Burger believed that "[i]t was unfair to punish [the
suburbs] by involving them in any city-suburb desegregation scheme." See WOODWARD
& ARMSTRONG, supra note 205, at 283. Some members of the Court, however, felt that
Burger's early drafts of the opinion shifted the balance too far in favor of the white
suburbs. Id. at 284-85.
279. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 205, at 267.
280. Id. at 283.
281. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-44 (finding the cost of altering the educational
structure, consolidation, transportation, and financing to be too high of a burden); see
also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213-14 (adopting a presumption against
racial imbalances).
282. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 738, 744-45. Chief Justice Burger, the author of Milliken,
"believed it was time for a definitive new direction." WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra
note 205, at 283.
283. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 763 (White, J., dissenting) (writing that "deliberate acts
of segregation and their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would
be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school
desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court
considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State"); id. at 768
("[R]emedies for constitutional violations ... must stop at the school district line.
Apparently, no matter how much less burdensome or more effective and efficient...
the metropolitan plan might be, the school district line may not be crossed.").
284. 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
285. Id. at 431.
286. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
287. Id. at 802.
2008] FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEXT CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 309
burden of proof in rebutting an employer's articulated reason for its
action, and to carry the burden of proving intentional discrimination
even after showing that the employer's articulated reason was
false.288
This weakening of the impact standard was prompted by the
inherent tension in employment cases between removing needless
discriminatory employment barriers for minorities and imposing a
burden on the efficient convenient operation of business.289 Removing
these barriers would require employers to do more than merely
implement the easiest or quickest hiring methods, and it would not
permit them to ignore the results of their actions. Thus, at the very
least, it would impose a self-monitoring and decision-making process
that seeks to avoid racial harm. Yet in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio290 and subsequent cases, the Court's analysis reflects the
perception that eliminating disparate impact and imposing less
discriminatory alternatives is outweighed by "the cost or other
burdens of proposed alternative selection devices."291 The Court's
primary concern was with preserving the discretion of those parties
whose actions created the impacts, rather than limiting the impact.
Thus, the Court deferred to employers' interests, concluding "[c]ourts
are generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices,"292 and henceforth warned lower courts to "proceed with
care" before upsetting an employer's business practices.293
In short, although the Court has sporadically suggested that its
intent standard is a measure of faulty or immoral conduct, its
continual shifting of the intent standard in the above cases with no
attention to fault indicates that either those references are
misleading or the Court is incorrect in its assessment of the
standard. In fact, the Court's acute attention to the practical results
throughout these cases indicates that it chose to change the intent
288. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993); Texas
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
289. The interest was originally recognized and justified in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court wrote that "fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation" is not acceptable, because the "absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431-32. The Court explicitly recognized that the interests of minorities in
eliminating disparate impacts and gaining access to employment override the
countervailing business interests, stating "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to
the consequences of employment practices." Id. at 432.
290. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
291. See id. at 661 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998
(1988)).
292. Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)).
293. Id.
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standard to achieve a particular set of results. In assessing those
results, however, the Court does not explain their desirability in
terms of the goals of equal protection or antidiscrimination. At most,
the Court appears to have its own set of implicit biases and values,
which it uses to assess what type of results its standards should
produce.
It is worth noting, moreover, that although not approaching the
decisions from a tort- or intent-standard perspective, some of the
foremost civil rights scholars have focused on the implicit goals
behind the Court's shifting standards and results. Their work sheds
further light on the relevance of the results and hidden goals in
antidiscrimination. Jerome Culp's work reveals that the initial
problem with analyzing the Court's intent standard through any
framework is the Court's lack of transparency. Culp argues that the
Court's lack of transparency is intentional and crucial to what he
sees as an attempt by the Court to further its own value-oriented
concept of equal protection.294 He argues that the Court is able to
pursue ulterior-yet obfuscated-purposes by articulating its
jurisprudence in the language of "colorblindness."295 The language of
"colorblindness" masks its antidiscrimination and equal protection
standards as moral standards of fault, when the adoption of
standards are actually value choices that are no more morally or
normatively justified than any other standard.296 Thus, the Court's
doctrines are simply policy preferences masquerading as morals.297
Despite the lack of transparency in the Court's jurisprudence,
Derrick Bell finds that the Court's decisions reveal a clear pattern
that permits him to ascribe a goal to the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence. He argues that its goal is largely to further the
interests of whites.298 Thus, the Court's precedent is not explained by
normative principles or fault, but by whether the results of any given
test or holding will benefit middle- and upper-class whites.299 For
instance, although Brown v. Board of Education300 is facially
motivated by the need to redress harm to blacks, Bell concludes that
the end was secondary to the country's need to limit racial apartheid
294. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 162,
177-94 (1994).
295. Id. at 173.
296. See id. at 194-95.
297. Id.
298. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
299. Id. at 523.
300. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to maintain its international legitimacy.301 Only when national and
white interests converge with those of blacks has the Court expanded
its antidiscrimination jurisprudence.302 He concludes that this goal
drives all of the Court's holdings and standards in race cases. 30 3
Thus, regardless of whether one agrees with the inferences authors
such as Culp and Bell make regarding the Court's goals, their work
reinforces this section's overall point: antidiscrimination standards
are not normative or fault based, but are shaped to produce results
consistent with a predetermined goal.
3. Intent As a New or Variable Concept of Equal
Protection and Antidiscrimination
Further undermining the notion that the intent standard is a
normative assessment of liability and a measure of fault or
blameworthiness is the fact that the intent standard is a modern
concept of equal protection and antidiscrimination that the Court
itself has created, rather than a longstanding equal protection
concept. Like tort standards, the standards demonstrating a violation
of equal protection or antidiscrimination statutes have existed in a
continuum across time based on the goals being pursued at a given
instant. The early cases from which the modern Court infers a
reliance on "intentional discrimination" made no reference to intent.
Until Brown, the Court grounded its decisions in an inquiry
predominantly revolving around the concept of "equality" rather than
discrimination. For instance, in Plessy v. Ferguson3o4 and its progeny,
the Court's analysis was based on whether "equality" existed.3o5 The
desegregation cases leading up to Brown were no different in their
analysis. The outcomes may have been different from Plessy, but only
because the facts demonstrated that the separation in a particular
school was not, in fact, equal.306 Admittedly, Strauder v. West
Virginia,3O7 to which the Court in Davis cites, involved racial
301. Bell, supra note 298, at 523-26.
302. Id. at 523-28.
303. Id.
304. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
305. Id. at 542, 551-52; see also Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175
U.S. 528, 542 (1899) (finding no violation because "[s]o far as the record discloses, both
races have the same facilities and privileges of attending them" and that all other
matters beyond securing equal rights were social issues).
306. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950)
(finding that segregative practices deprived student of the opportunity to receive an
equal, qualitative education); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950) (holding that
educational opportunities were not substantially equal); Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337, 344, 351 (1938) (holding that the state must furnish a "legal education
substantially equal" to whites).
307. 100 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1879).
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prejudice and discrimination against blacks in jury service, but the
Court found it objectionable because such discrimination prevented
blacks from securing the goal of equal protection. The Court
articulated the goal throughout as "securing to a race recently
emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in
slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy."308
When Brown was decided, it continued to rely on the paradigm
of equality, noting "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal"309 and, where the state provides a public right, that
"right.. . must be made available to all on equal terms."31o A shift
obviously occurred in Brown, but the shift was precipitated by the
Court and society's evolved notions of what amounted to equality and
equal treatment.
After Brown, equality and discrimination standards became
more plaintiff friendly, with the goal being to desegregate society and
eliminate barriers for racial minorities. The Court attempted to
achieve this by focusing on the results of a defendant's actions rather
than mens rea. For instance, school desegregation cases such as
Green and Swann found constitutional violations based entirely on
the effects of the schools' actions.311 The Court demanded immediate
action to eliminate disparities between schools and the opportunities
therein.312 Regardless of motive, no excuse was acceptable for not
achieving those results. The Court's approach to discrimination and
equality outside of the school context, in areas such as employment
or housing, was likewise focused on whether the defendants produced
308. Id. at 306.
No one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in all
the amendments, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of
them would have been suggested,-we mean the freedom of the slave race,
the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of
the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them.
Id. at 307 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872); see also Strauder,
100 U.S. at 307 ('What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the
same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall
stand equal before the laws of the States ... ").
309. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
310. Id. at 493.
311. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1971)
(indicating that the significant racial imbalance of schools alone may be sufficient to
warrant a remedy); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968) (holding that
courts must assess the racial imbalance of schools in various categories, including
school assignments, faculty and staff assignments, student activities, facilities, and
transportation).
312. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
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results that would alter the inequities suffered by racial
minorities.313
In Keyes and Davis, those standards began shifting to a mens rea
and motivational concern. However, even that shift, which seems so
radical and complete today, occurred gradually, as lower courts'
interpretation and application of the Court's intent doctrine still
varied considerably from where the standard is currently. Lower
courts sought to apply the intent doctrine not from a subjective
motivational perspective, but from an objective basis that inferred
intent based on the "foreseeable consequences of action taken,
coupled with inaction in the face of tendered choices."314 The Court
responded by holding that foreseeable consequences were merely
relevant evidence to prove intent and that "disparate impact and
foreseeable consequences, without more, do not establish a
constitutional violation."315 Yet, at the same time the Court was
changing the standard to a subjective one, it still conceded that it
could not fault the lower courts' conclusion that, in light of the
objective evidence, unconstitutional intent had occurred.316
Likewise, the complete shift to the intent standard in
antidiscrimination statutes like Title VI took time. For thirty years,
the Court allowed plaintiffs to assert claims of disparate impact
based on federal regulations enacted pursuant to Title VI, while at
the same time concluding that Title VI itself only created a cause of
action for intentional discrimination.317 Only recently did the Court
prohibit all Title VI claims based on disparate impact. In sum, the
variance in concepts of equality, discrimination, impact, and intent
across time demonstrates that no normative concept of fault or
313. See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
314. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1975); see also United
States v. Sch. Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 536 (8th Cir. 1975) (overturning a district court that
had failed to presume intent based on the "natural, probable and foreseeable
consequences" of the defendant's actions); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st
Cir. 1974) (stating that a "pattern of selective action and refusal to act can be seen as
consistent only when considered against the foreseeable racial impact of such
decisions"); Oliver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a "presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish
that the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of public officials' action or inaction
was an increase or perpetuation of public school segregation").
315. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); see also Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979).
316. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 463-64 & n.12 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of
Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 240 (S.D. Ohio 1977)); Dayton, 443 U.S. at 529-30, 535-37,
539-41.
317. Compare Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 586-89, with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
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liability exists in antidiscrimination laws. The standards, as in torts,
have been reflections of cultural concepts and goals of equality. Thus,
although today's Court might suggest otherwise, the intentional
discrimination standard is no more an inherent measure of fault or
an equal protection norm than any other standard.
4. The Court's Own Version of a Torts-Based Approach
Although the Court's preoccupation with results suggests that
the intent standard is not, in fact, a search for faulty or immoral
conduct, it does indicate that the Court follows an approach similar
to the torts-based approach discussed earlier.318 However, a torts-
based approach to equal protection standards would also first
acknowledge that the intentional discrimination standard is not an
end in and of itself, nor an inherent measure of fault, which the
Court has not done. Such an acknowledgement would reveal what is
currently hidden-that the intent standard is nothing more than an
attempt to pursue policy objectives and preferences. Thus, neither
the Court, nor future legislation, should preoccupy itself with
whether the intent standard reflects fault, morals, racial bias, or
some other supposed norm. Instead, the preoccupation should be
with whether the standard produces results consistent with our
antidiscrimination and racial equity goals.
A torts-based approach and assessment, more so than others,
explains the Court's decisions and provides a relatively neutral
framework for critiquing them. The framework effectively rejects the
notion that a normative evaluation of liability in equal protection is
value-free, and reveals that the preoccupation with norms, such as
fault, created the confusion and lack of transparency from which we
currently suffer. Thus, the torts framework focuses primarily on two
questions: (1) what are the goals of the law or system; and (2) does
the chosen standard effectively and efficiently achieve those goals?
The goals themselves would only be a point of analysis insofar as the
goals were contested or unclear. Consequently, given the Court's
apparent goals or its notion of the purpose of antidiscrimination, its
standard naturally follows. Thus, the standard itself is not the
problem or the appropriate focus of critique. Rather, the appropriate
critique would be either that: (1) the Court's current goals are
actually contrary to constitutional or statutory goals; or (2) the Court
miscalculates the practical results of the standard as being
consistent with its goals.
Consistent with the above approach, the Court has modified the
intent standard primarily where it reasoned that the standard's
318. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
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results would be inconsistent with the Court's goals.319 For instance,
the Court created a distinction between inter- and intradistrict
school desegregation to preserve the sanctity of private choice, school
structures, and suburban school districts.320 The distinction was not
driven by considerations of fault, but rather because the distinction
would produce particular results. Similarly, the Court initially
presumed discriminatory action was the cause of school
desegregation in all instances because its goal and concern was with
aggressive desegregation. But when pursuit of that goal posed too
great of a burden on schools and the status quo, the Court shifted the
burden of proof to plaintiffs to first prove intentional discrimination
before any presumption of impermissible segregation would apply to
schools.321 The obvious result was to blunt the likelihood and force of
desegregative remedies.
Similar tailoring of results to goals is represented in the Court's
retraction of the disparate impact standard and shift toward intent
in employment discrimination cases in order to protect business
interests through the business necessity defense322 and, later, the
legitimate explanation defense.323 In fact, the judicial motivations for
making changes in employment discrimination standards are
strikingly similar to the evolution of tort products liability. Initially,
courts applied straightforward tests to determine whether products
were unreasonably dangerous or dangerous beyond the expectation of
consumers.324 But when that test failed to reduce the dangerousness
319. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
320. Of course, the Court attempts to rely on a notion of fault to symbolically justify
its decision. However, as other members of the Court and scholars point out, the state
itself was at fault here, and, thus, there was no fault basis by which to exclude the
state's agents-the local districts-from the remedy. See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at
763 (White, J., dissenting) ("[D]eliberate acts of segregation and their consequences
will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in
terms of usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective
remedy would cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative
inconvenience to the State."); id. at 768 ("[T]he Court fashions out of whole cloth an
arbitrary rule that remedies for constitutional violations occurring in a single
Michigan school district must stop at the school district line. Apparently, no matter
how much less burdensome or more effective and efficient ... the metropolitan plan
might be, the school district line may not be crossed.").
321. See Black, supra note 32.
322. Oppenheimer, supra note 23, at 921.
323. Id.
324. See, e.g., Giglio v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 489 (Conn. 1980);
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104, 109 (S.D. 1973); Falk v. Keene Corp., 782
P.2d 974, 980 (Wash. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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of certain products,325 courts developed a cost-benefit analysis to
extend liability beyond the limits of consumer awareness and
expectation.326 When that proved too aggressive, the courts mitigated
the standard by requiring plaintiffs to additionally prove that a
reasonable alternative design existed and that it was economically
and technologically feasible.327 These requirements allowed courts to
produce results on par with the goal of making products safer rather
than simply compensating consumers for whatever harm might
befall them. The Supreme Court's employment discrimination
jurisprudence mirrors this evolution in significant respects. Initially,
the Court used a straightforward test of disparate impact to break
down barriers to minorities' entry into the workforce. But the Court
later mitigated the disparate impact standard by creating defenses of
business necessity and legitimate business purpose, because of the
desire to limit the scope of business liability.328
V. THE FRAMEWORK AND OPTIONS FOR ADOPTING FUTURE
DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY STANDARDS
Demonstrating that a torts approach is appropriate, or that the
intent standard is inconsistent with it, is a straightforward task.
More difficult is determining what standard might replace it and,
most importantly, what ends we wish the new standard to produce.
For years, courts and advocates have pitted the intent doctrine
against the impact standard, presenting both as monolithic
standards. This juxtaposition oversimplifies the paradigm. There are
various permutations of both standards and, depending on the
permutation, the standards can be minimal or significant burdens on
defendants. Moreover, each variation of the standards could be
appropriate depending on the ends sought. Thus, the intent standard
need not be focused solely on racial animus, motivations, or
subjectivity, but instead can be objective or place greater
responsibilities on defendants than current standards.329 However,
325. In particular, the test did not address those products that consumers knew to
be dangerous, but whose dangers the customers still had to confront due to work
requirements or everyday necessity. See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188,
1192 (Mass. 1978).
326. In some cases, a consumer might know of the danger and, thus, the early test
would not establish liability. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, 1987
WL 6486, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1987).
327. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d
(1998).
328. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
329. The intent required in intentional torts or in the natural and foreseeable
circumstances test for instance, is easier to apply consistently and accurately. For a
further discussion of how the current intentional discrimination standard could
incorporate concepts of deliberate indifference, see Black, supra note 32, at 537-41.
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choosing among standards requires an answer to the fundamental
question of what racial policies we wish to pursue. Our country must
now return to this question for the first time in decades if it wishes to
produce meaningful legislation.
A. Disparate Impact's Variations, Goals, and Results
The disparate impact standard, regardless of its particular
permutation, is an arbitrary standard unless appropriately linked to
a legislative, policy, or constitutional goal. At various times,
disparate impact has been seen by Congress and/or the Court as
producing results that are consistent with their goals.330 The Court,
however, without much explanation, no longer sees it as such.331
Questions, therefore, remain as to the goals furthered by a disparate
impact standard and where the standard falls within the spectrum of
available liability standards.
A "pure" disparate impact standard-one that determines
liability primarily based on the extent of the impact rather than the
defendant's ability to articulate a legitimate or nondiscriminatory
explanation-is essentially concerned with ameliorating racial harms
and burdens.32 In general, it displaces mens rea or intent entirely
and establishes liability irrespective of the blameworthiness of a
defendant's conduct.333 It represents a determination that society
should be ordered and operated along a particular line-a racially
equitable distribution of burdens, benefits, and opportunities. In
these respects, a pure disparate impact standard is akin to some
strict liability and workers compensation schemes.
Like strict liability, if a defendant chooses to enact policies that
will affect the opportunities, burdens, or benefits of individuals, the
defendant would accept responsibility when those decisions produce
racially disparate outcomes. Or, in federally funded programs, by
accepting the funds, the recipient would be agreeing to make certain
types of decisions and produce certain types of results.334 When the
330. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424 (finding that the existence of a racial
imbalance or disparate impact was sufficient to make out a claim in employment
discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (implementing a disparate impact standard); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (codified as amended in 1982) (overturning
Supreme Court decision and codifying a disparate impact standard).
331. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-86 (2001).
332. See Selmi, supra note 22, at 286-88.
333. The Court has never applied a pure disparate impact standard; the closest it
has come was in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424; see also Freeman, supra note 22 (finding that
Griggs was the most plaintiff-friendly use of the impact standard the Court has
implemented because it viewed the harm from the victim's perspective).
334. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
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recipient's policies and decisions produce results contrary to those
desired by federal legislation or regulation, liability would be
imposed.335 As with strict liability for abnormally dangerous
products, if a resulting harm occurs-here a racially disparate
impact-the defendant is liable. Benevolent motivations,
extraordinary precautions, and reasonable care are simply
irrelevant, unavailable defenses.
A pure disparate impact standard also reflects the primary focus
of workers compensation schemes on compensating and, hopefully,
ameliorating harm.336 Whether a defendant is at "fault" is beside the
point.337 If a worker or, in disparate impact, a racial group suffers
harm, the only relevant question is whether the harm occurred in the
context of the defendant's workplace, institution, or program. If the
goal is to ensure that injuries and racial harms are compensated and
avoided in the future, the defendants are in the best position to
achieve those ends. In contrast to plaintiffs, defendants can
systemically alter their conduct to minimize and avoid harms of a
particular nature or harms that affect a particular group. Moreover,
they can spread the cost of those harms across various groups and
factors and, consequently, efficiently compensate victims for those
harms. Given these goals, the only relevant issue is whether the
defendants are the cause of the harm-and, hence, could have
avoided it-not whether they are at "fault."
A "modified" racial disparate impact standard provides more
flexibility than the above "pure" standard. A modified standard
permits defendants to continue their course of action so long as they
can establish an acceptable explanation for it. The strictness of that
explanation depends on the results one wants to produce and the
party one wants to favor. The explanation could be as permissive as
requiring a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, which would
allow most impacts to remain in place, assuming either that racial
animus can be hidden or is nonexistent. The explanation could also
be as strict as requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the
particular course of action is a necessity, which would overturn
numerous policies, assuming that the defendant could soften the
policy objectives through a method that produces less disparate
impact.
335. See id. at 605-08.
336. For a discussion of how the Court used the disparate impact standard to
primarily address the harms suffered by racial minorities, see Freeman, supra note 22,
at 1093-99.
337. See, e.g., DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-33 (3d Cir.
1995) (stating that a "pure disparate impact case" would render irrelevant the reasons
why or the factors involved in producing the impact).
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As for mens rea, the existence or absence of malice or intent is
facially irrelevant to whether liability is imposed in a modified
impact standard.338 With that said, in some respects a modified
impact standard is not inconsistent with an intent standard, but
simply practical regarding whether and how one can prove it. For
instance, where a defendant cannot articulate a legitimate
explanation for a disparate impact, intentional or racially motivated
discrimination may very well be the explanation for the action.339
Thus, although the modified impact standard does not require an
explicit inference of intent, it may still impose liability in those
instances where it is likely that intent exists.340 Likewise, some
argue that in addition to consciously race-motivated action,
intentional discrimination includes actions that result from
subconscious biases and irrational beliefs.341 If a defendant cannot
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for his action, such
subconscious bias or irrationality is the best explanation for the
action.342 Thus, a modified impact standard challenges intentional
discrimination, but, in the process, prohibits a broader range of
policies and actions than the Court's current intent doctrine. The
modified impact standard is consistent with the realization that
searching for and identifying subjective intent is an inherently
unreliable and flawed task, and that an objective test that assumes
338. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988).
339. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 376 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("An avowed justification that has a significant disproportionate impact will rarely
qualify as a legitimate, race-neutral reason sufficient to rebut the prima facie case
because disparate impact is itself evidence of discriminatory purpose."); Tex. Dept. of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) ("We do not believe, however, that
limiting the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a burden of production will unduly
hinder the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its legitimate
reasons must be clear and reasonably specific.").
340. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 977.
341. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2002); Krieger, supra note 242, at
1188; Lawrence, supra note 173, at 317, 323; Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and
Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 532 (2003) (discussing
subconscious discrimination in America and stating that 'Title VII is concerned with
discrimination that is a function of employers' subconscious states of mind").
342. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent
Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1469, 1542 (2005) ("[O]nce the most common reasons
for employment actions are taken into account (or controlled for through the prima
facie case showing), the Court's evidentiary frameworks treat the possibility of even
subconscious bias lurking as a threat in decisionmaking processes."); Green, supra
note 242, at 104, 140 (discussing the prevalence and relevance of bias in employment
decisions and how the current dichotomous legal standards fail to account for it).
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one intends the natural consequences of one's actions, but still allows
one to defend those actions.343
A modified impact standard, however, is also consistent with the
goal of furthering a different concept of discrimination. Some argue
that intent is irrelevant to discrimination and equality.344 Rather,
discrimination occurs when one's actions treat racial groups
differently without any justification.345 A modified intent standard
would prohibit such inequality. The lack of a justification for the
inequality, rather than any intent, makes it discrimination. Others,
such as Oppenheimer, would argue that discrimination can occur
through simple negligence.
A modified impact standard prohibits this type of discrimination
by assessing whether alternative courses of action are available and
balancing the burdens and benefits of pursuing it. In essence, the
modified standard has a built-in ability to weigh racial burdens on
plaintiffs and costs on the defendant. When a preestablished
legitimate interest exists and no less discriminatory alternative can
achieve that interest, that interest necessarily outweighs the
disparate impact under the standard. The contraposition is likewise
true if a legitimate interest is absent or a less discriminatory option
is available.
On a conceptual level, a disparate impact standard's closest
corollary is current products liability. Disparate impact and products
343. See, e.g., Black, supra note 32, at 567 (stating that the subjective intent is
inconsistent with other constitutional torts); DOBBS, supra note 31, at 49 ("[T]he trier
of fact has no mind reading machine to determine.., subjective intent. One's
subjective intent is necessarily determined from external or objective evidence.").
344. The foremost discussion on this point may be Paul Brest's article. Paul Brest,
Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976);
see also TRIBE, supra note 22, at 1437-39, 1507 (discussing equal protection's
multiplicity and how motivations do not change the harms individuals suffer); Stacy E.
Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on
State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2007)
("Sometimes, not only in the metaphysical contexts of evil and suffering, but also in
the political contexts of workplaces and neighborhoods, intent matters little. 'What
goes on' in the hearts and minds of those who exclude, or who can prevent exclusion
but choose not to, is less important than how the benefits and burdens get distributed,
how they build on past exclusion, and whether the exclusion is justified.").
345. See generally Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal
Protection Clause: Why the Definition of "Equal" Requires a Disproportionate Impact
Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL-Y 85, 118-21, 128-33 (2002) (discussing the varying critiques of the intent
standard and the various differing concepts how equal protection should be achieved);
Seicshnaydre, supra note 344, at 1143 (arguing that unjustified inequality is
discrimination even in the absence of bad intent).
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liability both were initially much more plaintiff friendly.346 Both
looked primarily at the harm caused by a policy or product.347 If a
product's dangerousness was unreasonable or, in the case of
employment, a policy or hiring criteria was not related to a job,
liability would be justified regardless of the cost to the producer or
the purposes of the employer. However, believing they had gone too
far, courts and legislatures reined in these standards over time. As
stated previously, products liability required proof of a reasonable
alternative design before imposing liability, and disparate impact
later allowed defendants to assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the impact that defendants would have to rebut before
imposing liability.348 Thus, both went from a standard that imposed
liability based primarily on harm to a standard that balanced the
harm against the competing governmental, business, or social
interests.349
Products liability law, although continually evolving, still
maintains this core standard, but disparate impact as a measure of
liability has been entirely removed from equal protection, and either
eliminated or seriously limited in racial discrimination statutes.3 0 Of
course, in its place is the intent doctrine.351 The question before
Congress may soon be whether the intent standard should remain in
place, be modified, or be replaced.
As discussed throughout this Article, standards are justified by
the ends that they are adopted to produce, not by a normative
concept of fault.352 Unless the goal of statutory antidiscrimination is
merely to prevent overt racial discrimination and animus, it is not
clear how the intent standard can produce results consistent with
other, broader goals of antidiscrimination laws. It simply does not
challenge any activities beyond those that are explicitly racially
motivated. Consequently, the intent standard lacks the capacity to
change other forms of discriminatory or inequitable behavior that
346. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 124 (Cal. 2001).
347. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424; see also Merrill, 28 P.3d at 124.
348. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that
disproportionate impact alone is not enough to prove racial discrimination), with
Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Miss. 2006) (requiring claimant to
demonstrate a reasonable alternative design to establish a prima facie design defect
claim).
349. In this respect, some have asserted that both products liability and modified
disparate impact standards correlate with negligence. See Oppenheimer, supra note
23, at 969.
350. See Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1105-06 (1989).
351. See id.
352. See supra notes 135-43.
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perpetuate the barriers and disadvantages that racial minorities
face. However, a modified disparate impact standard, similar to
products liability, represents a middle ground between the intent
standard's limited ability to alter inequity and the pure impact
standard's propensity to remedy vast inequity at the potential
expense of other interests.
Tort law has favored this sort of middle-ground approach when
the goal has been to produce higher degrees of social utility.353
Insofar as the intentional discrimination standard is rationalized or
facially presented as a normative fault principle or measure of
blameworthiness, it simply misplaces its focus. It was precisely the
failure of "fault" standards to produce the desired ends and goals that
led torts away from them in certain instances, such as products
liability.354 One of the primary goals of tort law in regard to consumer
products was to reduce accidents and safety costs. 355 Consumers were
ill-equipped to do this themselves, and principles of intent or
negligence premised on fault could not consistently ensure that
manufacturers did it.356 Thus, legislatures and courts abandoned
"fault" standards in products liability for the current standards,
which exist somewhere between negligence and strict liability.357 As
a result, manufacturers have altered their conduct, which has
resulted in fewer accidents, higher safety, and reduced costs
overall.358
If a goal of antidiscrimination were to reduce otherwise
avoidable racial inequities or spread the burden of those inequities
across society, a modified disparate impact standard would
presumably have an effect similar to, and as significant as, products
liability. Yet, if reducing or spreading the burden of such racial
inequities is a goal, no standard short of a modified impact standard
or a standard similar to it is capable of producing results consistent
with that goal. The intent doctrine disregards inequitable results.359
353. See DOBBS, supra note 31, at 12.
354. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability and the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 846-47 (1996).
355. Id. at 847; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24-94 (1970); Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed
by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 627 (2005)
(discussing how Calabresi has viewed tort law as a way to protect public welfare by
economic means).
356. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 354, at 848.
357. See id. at 851.
358. Id. at 859.
359. See, e.g., David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy's 'Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2571 (1995) (pointing out that
even when there is no intent to discriminate on the basis of race, racial inequity may
nonetheless be the result); Comment, Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal
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In fact, its primary effect is to leave past and perpetuated inequities
in place.360 Consequently, it places the burden of eliminating inequity
on the individual agency of racial minorities-but individual agency
is not apt to produce systemic results.361 Moreover, insofar as racial
minorities in many areas lack the political or economic power to force
governments or businesses to willingly avoid racial impacts, they
often also lack the power to achieve such results through collective
agency.3 62 In contrast, a modified impact standard places the onus on
those who have the greatest capacity to mitigate racial inequity.
However, placing the burden of change on elected officials, whose job
it is to serve the people, or on those who use federal funds to operate
an institution, is no more undue than the burden tort places on those
who are engaged in the business of selling products for profit. Thus,
liability under a modified disparate impact standard is appropriate,
not because defendants are at "fault" in a normative sense, but
because they, more so than others, have the capacity to produce both
the harms society wishes to avoid and goals it wishes to achieve.
It is also worth emphasizing that, like products liability, a
modified impact standard would only impose a burden on defendants
when alternative courses of action are available and pursuing them
does not unreasonably interfere with the government, entity, or
business's purposes for acting in the first instance. Based on this
similarity, the burden of adopting a modified disparate impact
standard would be no greater than the tort responsibility we already
impose on businesses across the country. And once we determine that
Protection and Public Housing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 440 (1970) (discussing
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), and stating, "[tihe
Gautreaux court's holding that 'intent' must be proved leaves [foreseeable] inequality
in government programs constitutionally unassailable").
360. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 34-35 (2004) (arguing that
the intent standard permits the perpetuation of inequality in racial profiling, and
further arguing that the inequality is a continuing effect of the stigma of slavery);
Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and
Disadvantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 629 (1992) (concluding
the intent standard has led to the "entrenchment of inequality"); Imani Perry, Post-
Intent Racism: A New Framework for an Old Problem, 19 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 113, 121-
22 (2006) ("Instead of claiming that the standards deceptively obscure intentional
racism, critical race theorists call into question the objective standards themselves
because they replicate racial disadvantage.").
361. See Iris Marion Young, Equality of Whom?-Social Groups and Judgments of
Injustice 25 (Feb. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.pitt.edu/
-wpseries/papers/PIA005.pdf).
362. This, however, is not to suggest that collective action cannot produce change; it
certainly can. It is only to recognize that there is a political component that may
counteract those efforts in certain circumstances, and a legal remedy is often
necessary to overcome it. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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a disparate impact, cost-benefit, or some other standard is
appropriate, a finding of liability does not imply that fault is a
normative notion of intent, malice, motivation, or negligence, but
simply that the chosen standard has been transgressed. Liability or
fault in this context is the failure to comply with the statutorily or
jurisprudentially identified conduct.
B. Looking Outside the Box for Other Options
The intentional discrimination and disparate impact standards
have dominated antidiscrimination jurisprudence and thought, but
there is no reason to continue to limit the discussion to these two
options. As briefly mentioned earlier, courts have previously relied on
a natural and foreseeable consequences test to prove violations of
equal protection.363 Oppenheimer has also argued that the Court's
employment discrimination standards during the 1980s were akin to
negligence.364 Both of these standards proved workable and effective
at the time. The move away from them was not based on a flaw in the
standards themselves, but an effort by the Court to pursue other
ends.
The available options also span beyond our past experience in
race discrimination. Other antidiscrimination paradigms, such as
disability, have developed their own liability standards. In disability,
plaintiffs must establish "intentional" discrimination, but intent
includes actions that lack invidious or inappropriate motivation.
Courts have indicated that "intentional discrimination against the
disabled does not require personal animosity or ill will. Rather,
intentional discrimination may be inferred when a 'policymaker
acted with at least deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood
that a violation of federally protected rights will result."'365 In this
context, deliberate indifference is tantamount to realizing the harm
that an action will create, but nevertheless taking such action. In
essence, the courts are looking for the cause of inequality under the
law. If inequality is a result of conscious choices, courts often will
impose liability.366 It is also worth noting that if a plaintiff is not
363. See supra notes 48, 315-16 and accompanying text; see also Black, supra note
32, at 565-67.
364. See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 23.
365. Bartlett v. New York, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ferguson v.
City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688, 697 (D. Ariz. 1996)); see, e.g., Duvall v. County of
Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d
1147, 1153 (10th Cir.1999).
366. See, e.g., Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 331; Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 58 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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seeking monetary damages, he need not even show intent, because
the focus is on eliminating inequality and barriers.367
Of course, entirely new standards or modifications of old ones
might also be options. For instance, I have proposed a modified
deliberate indifference standard in other articles.368 In the case of
governmental defendants, the standard focuses on whether the
government is actively cognizant of its citizens' rights and the harm
it might cause them. When the defendant causes racially disparate
results or harms, liability would be determined by objective factors:
whether the government was, or should have been, aware of the
consequences of its actions; whether other less harmful reasonable
alternatives were or are available; and whether there is any reason
or competing interest that dictates against implementing an
available alternative.69 The final inquiry requires the defendant to
justify its choice to perpetrate or continue a racial harm-in spite of
available alternatives-with some purpose or interest that outweighs
the harm.
This last inquiry, admittedly, could allow judicial values and
biases to creep into the analysis. However, this type of balancing is
not radically different from many of the implicit choices the Court
has regularly made in equal protection and antidiscrimination
statutes.370 The difference under this standard is that the balancing
would be transparent. Interestingly, this sort of balancing is also
similar to that which occurs in negligence, products liability, and
other torts. The important benefit of transparent analysis in those
contexts is that it provides for an opportunity to test issues of
efficiency and utility with hard evidence, rather than leaving the
balancing subject to hidden assumptions and biases. The point here,
367. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985); Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 331; Tyler
v. Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997); M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721,
200 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Minn. 2002).
368. Black, supra note 32, at 575-85.
369. Id. at 575.
370. The Court has had significant experience in balancing racial harms and
benefits against other interests to which it could turn to for guidance, such as
balancing tests in employment discrimination and Title VI cases, or requiring
compelling interests to justify affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (requiring a compelling interest); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring an important interest); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (weighing the burden of alternatives), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (requiring a business necessity to
outweigh disparate impact), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D.
Tex. 2000) (requiring an educational necessity to outweigh impact). The Court,
likewise, balances private interests against governmental costs in due process. See,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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however, is not to promote a particular standard, but simply to
demonstrate that myriad options are available beyond those on
which we normally concentrate. Depending on our goals, any one of
them could be appropriate.
C. Aligning Goals with Results
Determining what standard will work, or whether some
particular standard is consistent with a given set of goals, is not
difficult. Rather, engaging in an open discussion about the goals of
antidiscrimination and what they have been, are, and should be is
the difficult task.
As already discussed, equal protection and antidiscrimination
standards have changed significantly over time.371 Until the mid-
twentieth century, the goal was to maintain the status quo of white
hegemony and dominance of resources and opportunities by
sanctioning segregation and inequality in every facet of life.372 Brown
signaled the end of that sanction, and by the 1960s and early 1970s,
the goal shifted dramatically to affirmatively interrupting the status
quo and ameliorating massive inequalities in the public sector.37 3 The
same goal also prevailed in the private sector, though only to the
extent that it was not overly burdensome in the given context, such
as housing, employment, or public accommodations.374 However, the
rules and principles that made those changes possible eventually
proved to be a greater threat to the status quo than subsequent
members of the Court, and much of society, would tolerate.375 Thus,
the Court began to retract that challenge to the status quo, to the
point where antidiscrimination law now generally serves to insulate
and preserve the status quo from legal attack.376 In general, equal
protection and antidiscrimination statutes currently only prohibit
explicit discrimination and animus, though such is no longer the
prevalent form of discrimination.377
As a constitutional amendment, the goals of equal protection are
subject to but a single opinion-that of the Supreme Court.378 Given
the trend of the current Court, a significantly different interpretation





376. See supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
377. See id.
378. Congressional actions and cultural context can have a significant effect on the
Court. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (various amicus briefs
submitted to the Court playing huge role); Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict
Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 21, 36-48 (2004).
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of the appropriate goals of equal protection is unlikely.79 In contrast,
however, the meaning and goals of antidiscrimination statutes do not
belong to the Court. They belong to our citizenry and elected
representatives. For instance, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to expand legal protections beyond the boundaries of equal
protection and increase the government, courts, and citizens' ability
to combat segregation and discrimination.30 For more than thirty
years, the statue was effective in doing so, often through a disparate
impact standard. When the Court narrowed the statute in
conjunction with narrowing equal protection, Congress responded by
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct the Court's missteps,
particularly in voting and employment.381 However, in recent years
the Court has again retracted the scope of the statute, raising the
question of whether it has done so appropriately and, if not, how
these wrongs should be corrected.382
A primary point of focus in assessing the Court's contraction of
antidiscrimination law is the accuracy or efficacy of its weighing and
balancing of the competing interests. Insofar as one assumes that the
Court's bias toward the status quo is borne, not from racial or other
illegitimate bias, but by a judgment about efficiency or social utility,
that judgment is open to a neutral critique. Based on the Court's
holdings, its implicit assumption is that favoring the status quo,
businesses, and individual choices at the expense of otherwise
needless racial impacts produces socially productive and efficient
results.383 In other words, the failure to protect the status quo would
379. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007) (finding that Justice Kennedy has taken a
new stance on race issues, but that this new position is no more progressive than those
of the previous Justices who held swing votes).
380. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2000)).
381. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
383. Of course, the Court could also be making a judgment based on its assumption
that the majority of the public favors the continuation of the status quo, business, or
some other interest, rather than the Court itself making a social utility judgment. In
effect, the Court could be attempting to maintain its legitimacy. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ.
of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) ("Local control over the
education of children allows citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allows
innovation so that school programs can fit local needs."); see also Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (requiring that local interests be taken into account in the
determination of desegregation cases); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Silent Resurrection of
Plessy: The Supreme Court's Acquiescence in the Resegregation of America's Schools, 9
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's
increasing deference to local control in desegregation cases). However, insofar as the
public may again speak for itself through Congress and legislation-and the premise of
this Article is to provide the framework for doing so-this Article need not address the
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create too much upheaval, and any benefits derived from it would not
outweigh the upheaval.
The Court's assumption may be incorrect. The assumption, in
most respects, broaches mere questions of fact about real costs and
benefits. A harder look at the facts suggests that the Court is
shortsighted in its approximation of the benefits and burdens. The
Court's standards sanction racial harms and impacts, which have
effects on individuals, communities, and structures that go far
beyond the immediate circumstances in the cases themselves. For
instance, whether certain racially disparate hiring criteria are
prohibited can be the difference between numerous families
obtaining a living wage for generations to come and simply
struggling to remain above the poverty line. Whether a community
can alter or challenge the site selection for a new school-or the
attendance boundaries drawn for it and other schools-can be the
difference between an education that allows subsequent generations
to gain upward economic mobility and an education that relegates
them to inadequate schools, trapping them in the same way it
trapped their parents. Where the next public housing units will be
developed in any given city, and whether it will serve families or
elderly individuals, can be the difference between: (1) the
perpetuation of segregation and inequality in the economic, health,
educational, and employment sectors; and (2) integration and
equality of access to high quality services and opportunities in all of
those areas. The Court's recent decisions limiting liability and
remedies through the intent standard show no significant
appreciation of these factual realities.as4 Some critics of the Court
even posit that the Court does not merely overlook the cost or burden
on minorities and marginalized groups, but rather devalues the
worth of the experiences and opportunities of minorities, rendering
their burdens largely irrelevant in a cost-benefit analysis.385
Court's possible explanation in that respect. Rather, it can proceed in regard to the
remaining available explanation. Moreover, such a concern by the Court seems ironic,
since civil rights legislation has always expanded protection beyond that which the
Court had recognized, and has been enacted, at least in 1991, to correct the Court's
conservatism.
384. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
385. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, The Law and Culture-Shift: Race and the Warren
Court Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1112-20 (2002) (critiquing the Court's
treatment of blacks as "unwanted traffic"); Conference, The Supreme Court, Racial
Politics, and the Right to Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights Act,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994); Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-Blindness
in the Rehnquist Court: Comparing the Court's Treatment of Discrimination Claims by
a Black Death Row Inmate and White Voting Rights Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
815, 850 (1996).
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In contrast, the Court is acutely attuned to the costs and
burdens that eliminating the above disparities would place on
government, businesses, and other entities.386 The Court, however,
appears to misjudge and overvalue the extent of those costs. 3 7 It
focuses on the immediate costs and emphasizes the restructuring
that might be required.388 Of course, it is hard to place much
confidence in estimated costs of change if those estimating the costs
have any reason to be predisposed against change. Exorbitant claims
of costs and burdens were wildly overstated by those who opposed
Brown and its progeny as a rationalization for their biases in
maintaining school segregation and other inequalities.389
In addition, even if the Court is correct as to immediate costs, it
takes a shortsighted view. The inconvenience or cost to a
government, agency, or business to minimize racial impacts and
increase opportunity is often a one-time inconvenience, or an
inconvenience that, at the very least, diminishes significantly over
time.390 Many structural elements, such as the siting of a housing
development or school occur only one time. Of course, employment
criteria, hiring decisions, locating school boundaries, or setting
admissions criteria may be continually adjusted each year and
require reoccurring attention. But those processes generally occur
regardless of the consideration of racial impacts and, once that
consideration is included initially, it becomes merely one of several
other considerations that would have occurred anyway.391
Admittedly, the short-term costs of any restructuring or additional
administrative burdens can be significant, but they are still limited
in duration. The Court's failure to account for the burdens over time
386. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
387. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 37 (2004) (indicating that
"[alithough the calculation should be straightforward, in practice there is a tendency to
overestimate the costs of regulations in advance of their implementation").
388. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (focusing on the
myriad laws that the Court believed would be overturned and restructured by a
disparate impact standard); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (arguing that
recognizing McCleskey's claim would lead to the invalidation of a host of criminal
laws).
389. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
1157, 1208 (2000) (arguing that opposition to unitary status proceedings based on cost
became moot when the United States decided to cover the costs of litigation in United
States v. Georgia, 702 F. Supp. 1577, 1581 (M.D. Ga. 1989)).
390. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 387, at 37-39 (arguing that the
costs of environmental regulatory compliance diminishes over time).
391. See id.
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results in its weighing the short-term costs to the status quo against
the short-term benefits to minorities. Regardless of the Court's goals,
this failure renders its judgment regarding the comparative costs and
benefits suspect. When weighing the long-term benefits to minorities
against the short-term costs to the status quo, a judgment that the
latter outweighs the former would be difficult to substantiate.
School desegregation is but one powerful example of this.
Desegregating our schools required enormous structural changes and
economic commitments.392 A steadfast commitment to desegregation
existed for at least two decades.393 Unfortunately, the commitment
fell short of complete desegregation and, in many instances, has
resulted in resegregation.394 Notwithstanding our shortfalls and the
enormous burden created by desegregation, the fruits of
desegregation have grown exponentially over the years.395 African
American academic achievement skyrocketed in every respect-
literacy rates, high school graduation rates, college attendance,
college graduation, positions in the academy, and scholarship.396
Moreover, there is simply no longer a significant cost-if there ever
really were-to government or private entities for these continually
accruing benefits. Similar arguments could also be made in regard to
housing, employment, and voting, to name just a few. In short, the
benefits of reducing racial inequality and impacts accrue over long
periods of time, whereas the costs of reducing them occur in the short
392. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagin & Bernice McNair Barnett, Success and Failure: How
Systemic Racism Trumped the Brown v. Board of Education Decision, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1099, 1102-04.
393. See, e.g., id. at 1108-09 (noting that while the Supreme Court made its most
meaningful school desegregation decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, that
commitment had been largely undermined by the 1990s).
394. See id. at 1109 (stating that decisions in Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991), and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) resulted in large-scale resegregation
of the involved schools); see also GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, Civ. RTS. PROJECT,
BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSYS NIGHTMARE? (2004), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg04/brown5O.pdf (finding that
schools have resegregated over the past two decades and are now as segregated as
they were in 1970, when desegregation was first initiated in earnest).
395. See, e.g., Feagin & Barnett, supra note 392, at 1109-14.
396. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
169, 191 (1999) (reviewing GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN E. EATON & THE HARVARD PROJECT
ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996)) ("In 1971, the difference between white and
black thirteen-year-olds in average reading scores on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) was 39 points (on a scale from 0 to 500), but by 1990 it
had decreased to 18 points. Similarly, the gap in math scores between white and black
seventeen-year-olds ... had fallen to 21 points by 1990.... [Test scores in every age
group and for each subject tested demonstrated a similar pattern over roughly the
same time period. Likewise, the gap between white and black high school and college
graduation rates closed dramatically.").
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term. Thus, any standard premised on a balancing of burdens and
benefits must look far beyond the immediately apparent burden and
benefit.
In all fairness, assigning a value to the long-term benefits of
reducing racial impacts is an inherently difficult endeavor. Although
economists could surely project wealth increases and the value of
certain opportunities, and compare them to the administrative and
structural costs necessary to produce them, their projections would
most likely lack the level of preciseness to permit us to reduce the
question to one of simple math.397 Disagreements among economists,
moreover, would certainly arise. However, even if these
impracticalities did not exist, the issue of what the real costs and
benefits of a particular standard are cannot be reduced solely to an
issue of economics. First, if economic analysis indicated the financial
and administrative cost is higher than the financial and opportunity
benefit to minorities, does it then follow or require concession that
the Court's adoption of the intent standard is justified and that the
standard strikes the appropriate balance of social values and utility?
Likewise, even though the long-term monetary benefits most likely
outweigh the administrative costs, is that alone a basis to determine
that it is appropriate for the law to be more aggressive in requiring
change?398 In the area of civil rights, the most common answer is that
economics, at best, is only part of the equation because much of the
value derived and the rights protected are intangible.99
The benefits of racial equity, fairness, and integration are
priceless.400 They have an intrinsic value morally, constitutionally,
397. See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 387, at 39-40.
398. Some would certainly argue that business is best suited to make such
judgments and will naturally make changes when necessary to produce more efficient
results.
399. See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, Targeting the Majority:
Redesigning Racial Profiling, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 317, 330-34 (2006) (pointing out
that racial profiling cannot be simply evaluated from an efficiency perspective, but
must also take into account the invaluable equities at stake in racial stigma and
inequity).
400. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 387, at 39 (discussing
regulation to improve the quality of human life and writing "the benefits are, literally,
priceless"); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV 1785,
1795-96 (2001) (responding to the critique of legal services that the money would be
better spent on food, shelter, and the like for the poor, demonstrating that the benefits
the legal services bring to the poor far outweighs what the funding could purchase in
other goods and services, and characterizing legal services as a "public good"). See
generally Robert L. Spurrier, Jr., Federal Constitutional Rights: Priceless or Worthless?
Awards of Money Damages Under Section 1983, 20 TULSA L.J. 1, 17-30 (1984)
(demonstrating the difficulty in assessing the damages or value of deprivations of
constitutional rights).
RUTGERS LAWREVIEW
culturally, and politically.401 One simply cannot place a value on the
benefits that racial diversity brings to our country, or on the
noneconomic benefit of educational attainment or higher quality of
life that would result from reducing racial inequity. As the Supreme
Court wrote in Grutter v. Bollinger,402 "[N]othing less than the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples."'403 Likewise, one cannot easily measure the cost to those
same individuals and communities of a low quality of life that results
from racial inequality, or the cost to our nation that results from
what some characterize as racial groups living in separate worlds. As
civil rights advocates proclaimed, the culture of racial segregation
was a "disease" that undermined our basic values and had far-
reaching 'psychological, economic, social, and political'
consequences."404 Thus, we must be careful about "monetizing the
things we hold most dear [because it] ends up cheapening and
belittling them."405
However, insofar as individuals, courts, or legislatures balance
these "priceless" benefits against costs, they necessarily assign some
value to the benefits. That value is largely a factor of idiosyncratic
preferences, biases, and a general view of what the world should look
like. Thus, some may conclude that no administrative or economic
burden is too great to see racial equity expand. Others may want to
see racial equity expand, but only at a cost that they believe is
economically efficient or reasonable. For them, although equity is not
exactly quantifiable, it is not an interest that they value the most
and, at some point, its cost is outweighed by the burdens it imposes.
Others, due to personal bias, vested interest in the status quo, or
minimal concern with racial inequity, may believe that almost any
burden placed on the government or private sector outweighs the
racial impact that individuals and communities suffer. Some would
argue that the Court's balancing of interest, in fact, reflects either
these biases or, based on the above, simply miscalculates the actual
401. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 553-55 (1974) (holding that
damages were properly sought in a suit claiming that disciplinary proceedings at a
state prison violated inmates' constitutional right to due process).
402. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
403. Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
404. Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 274 (2006) (quoting
Malcolm X & James Farmer, Separation or Integration: A Debate, DIALOGUE, May
1962, reprinted in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 400 (1971)).
The article further states that "the psychological 'damage that is done to Negroes is
obvious [and] the damage that is done to whites in America is equally obvious."' Id.
405. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 387, at 40.
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benefits and burdens of the intent standard or other alternative
standards.406 In either respect, the Court would be misguided.
In the end, however, the Court's accuracy is irrelevant. The
questions now are what value we assign to racial equity, what results
we wish to see, and whether we are comfortable with the status quo
and the pace of progress. Once we confront these questions, the task
of Congress will simply be to approach the new legislation as it would
tort legislation and determine what standard will best achieve our
ends.
CONCLUSION
The intentional discrimination standard has dominated equal
protection since the 1970s and has more recently been expanded into
antidiscrimination statutes as well. The Court, however, has allowed
the standard to dominate its jurisprudence without providing much,
if any, explanation as to how this standard fits within our societal
goals and values. Rather, the Court's primary justification focuses on
this standard's ability to somehow measure whether a defendant has
engaged in faulty or wrongful conduct. The lessons of tort
jurisprudence demonstrate that the Court makes the false
assumption that such a thing as "faulty" conduct exists, can be
accurately identified, or is even relevant. Conduct is labeled "faulty"
not because of a normative concept of fault, intent, mens rea, or
culpability, but merely because we choose a standard that will
produce societal goals. When one transgresses the standard, he is
said to be at fault.
The result of the intent standard has further permitted the
continuation of racial and other inequities that the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and other legislation were presumably designed to
counteract. Notwithstanding its traditional practice of overturning
Supreme Court decisions that created such contradictions, Congress
has been inactive on this front for over a decade and a half. Much of
this inactivity is likely attributable to the public's perception of civil
rights and the ascendancy of the Republican Party in Congress and
the White House.
The pendulum, however, is now swinging back toward the
attitudes and party that instituted much of our civil rights
legislation. Thus, the country may soon again deliberate civil rights
legislation. This time it must not fall victim to the polemics regarding
whether an intent or impact standard is more appropriate. It must
406. See generally Staci Rosche, Note, How Conservative Is the Rehnquist Court?
Three Issues, One Answer, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689-2704 (1997) (concluding
that recent trends indicate a "closing [of] the doors of the Court to the nation's
minorities, transforming that institution into an instrument of the status quo").
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instead absorb tort law's lessons and determine the goals and values
of antidiscrimination law. Although these goals have the potential to
become as contentious as the impact versus intent debate, they are
transparent, subject to the democratic process, and, as such, provide
the prospect for a neutral process. Once the decision is in the
appropriate decision makers' hands, crafting a standard becomes a
mechanical task rather than a substantive one. As in tort law, the
question is simply: what standard can produce the desired results?
